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ABSTRACT 
 
Taking into account the global nature of cyberspace, and the fact that all nations are 
vulnerable to threats therein, Cybersecurity seems to be an ideal area to pursue international 
cooperation. Despite the increasing number of cyberattacks faced by the United States, however, 
it has been passive and sometimes openly opposed to the creation of any multilateral treaties. 
Meanwhile, despite Russia’s apparent willingness to utilize cyber weapons, it has been pursuing 
multilateral solutions through the UN, along with allies such as China, as far back as 1998. This 
project aims to explain these contradictory policy stances by applying traditional international 
relations theories, namely Offense-Defense, Soft-Balancing, and Soft Power, to the emerging 
Cybersecurity field. The conclusion is that there is not one discrete answer to this conundrum; 
rather the likely explanation is somewhere in between. 
 
Keywords: Cybersecurity; Cyberspace; United States; Russia; United Nations; Offense-Defense 
Theory; Soft Balancing; Soft Power. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Area 
The spontaneous creation of the Internet is one of the defining moments of our time. 
Created by researchers for the purpose of communication amongst connected networks, few 
could have predicted how the Internet has evolved. It is utilized in almost every aspect of both 
public and private life. However, what can be used for good will inevitably be used for ill. There 
are a variety of ways in which cyberspace can be used for illicit purposes against the public and 
private sector. These activities range from cybercrime, to cyber terrorism, to cyber warfare. 
The United States is especially vulnerable to such attacks for many reasons. Tech 
comprises one of the most profitable industries. The U.S. spends more on research and 
development than any other nation. Extensive data collection means the U.S. has massive 
reserves of data to be stolen. Additionally, the U.S. is one of the most connected countries in 
the world1. 
This threat is described by the White House as follows: 
 
Cyber threats are among the gravest national security dangers to the United States. 
Our citizens, our private sector, and our government are increasingly confronted 
by a range of actors attempting to do us harm through identity theft, cyber-
enabled economic espionage, politically motivated cyberattacks, and other 
malicious activity
2
 
 
Several successful cyberattacks against U.S. companies and the public sector have received 
prominent media attention in recent months, such as the massive attack against Sony and the 
data breach of the Office of Personnel Management of United States (OPM)3 substantiating 
the claim that they are unprepared and vulnerable. 
Despite the fact that the U.S. has prioritized cyber defense as part of their national 
security policy, they remain one of the prime targets of cyberattacks. The nature of the 
Internet, being both open and anonymous since its creation, makes it very difficult to regulate 
                                                          
1 From the Huwaei Report found at <http://www.huawei.com/minisite/gci/en/huawei-global-connectivity-index-  
2015-whitepaper-en.pdf> Accessed 22 October 2015. 
2 Quote taken from the official White House website <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/02/25/fact-  sheet-cyber-threat-intelligence-integration-center> Accessed 22 October 2015. 
3 The Office of Personnel Management of United States had 4.2 million employees personal data stolen by 
cyberattacks. Available at: <https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/>. Accessed 22 Oct 2015. 
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this kind of activity. Furthermore, as technology develops, hacking and similar efforts are 
becoming easier than ever. One person with a computer and a desire to inflict damage has the 
potential to do more harm than entire militaries could in the past. The more connected the world 
becomes, the more vulnerable it is to attack. 
Naturally, states are concerned with protecting themselves from these cyber threats, but 
the way forward is unclear. Cybersecurity is an international challenge that is not constrained by 
sovereign borders. It would reason that by nature of the composition of cyberspace, and 
considering the global nature of threats to cybersecurity, that states would seek to address this 
issue on an international level. This has so far not been the case. There has been little headway 
on the path towards the creation of international cyber arms control. Furthermore, the efforts that 
have been made in the arena have been spearheaded not by the United States, whose 
vulnerability makes it the obvious candidate, but by Russia. Russia, often with the support of 
China, has been advocating a global solution to the cybersecurity issue for nearly two decades, 
long before the threat reached this critical stage.  How can this discrepancy be accounted for? 
 
1.2 Problem Formulation 
The  issues  mentioned  in  the  previous  section  lead  us  to  this  problem  formulation:  
 
Considering the United States is in many ways the most vulnerable to cyber threats, why 
has its stance towards international cooperation on cybersecurity measures been passive, while 
Russia, often in conjunction with China, has been pursuing a multilateral solution through the 
UN?  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
Based on the problem formulation proposed, this work aims to answer the following 
research questions: 
 
1. What roles have the U.S./Russia played in the creation of a UN cybersecurity 
agreement? 
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2. How has the U.S. responded to proposed agreements? 
3. What motivations does Russia have for a multilateral solution? 
4. What is the significance of Sino-Russian collaboration on this issue? 
5. Considering the agreements that have thus far been proposed by Russia and its 
allies, who would most benefit from these agreements? 
6. Are there any reasons that make a multilateral solution, such as the one proposed 
by Russia, difficult to establish? 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter seeks to describe the methodological strategies applied to collect the 
information presented in this project. Thus, the project presents: the motivation for researching 
this subject and its relevance to the International Relations arena; the project design and its 
structure; the choice of methods, explaining the methods used to develop the research; the 
conceptual clarifications, where the main concepts addressed in the project are explained; and, 
the delimitations found in the research according to the problem area.   
 
2.1 Motivation  
Cybersecurity is currently a hot topic in the International Relations and the Global Studies 
arena. There are many discussions related to how to deal with the concept of Cybersecurity, if a 
new framework needs to be developed in order to study this type of threat, and concerning whether 
it is a real threat to the international environment or whether the threat is being blown out of 
proportion by the media and politicians. Regardless, many respected International Relations 
theorists have been focusing on this subject and furthering their research since the beginning of 
the Internet age in the 1990’s.  
One such researcher who has focused on cybersecurity threats is Joseph Nye, who in the 
past few years has published several articles about this topic4. One of his arguments is that "cyber 
weapons" should be treated with the same concern as nuclear weapons and preventive measures 
should be taken to stop their spread. Otherwise, he fears cyber weapons could also experience a 
period of proliferation and an arms race, or that there could be a singular event with the same 
implications as the dropping of the first atomic bomb. 
Joseph Nye’s fears are also echoed by many states within the international system. Many 
of these states have already developed their own policy agendas in dealing with the new global 
cybersecurity issues.  Countries such as the United States, which often claims and can provide 
                                                          
4 The most recent Joseph Nye’s publications  are available in:  
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/index.html?groupby=6&=&filter=3&page=1. The most recent ones 
related to cybersecurity are: “The World Needs an Arms-control Treaty for Cybersecurity” (Published in October, 
2015 and “Is Cybersecurity Like Arms Control” (Published in May, 2015). 
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evidence of being the main target of many cyberattacks,5 has developed extensive policy positions 
and taken measures to protect itself from these cyberattacks. However, while the U.S. has 
developed extensive unilateral measures, it has remained passive with regard to pursuing a global 
solution to this topic. This stance is at odds with other major players in the cybersecurity arena, 
such as Russia, who have developed foreign policy to deal with the issue and have been seeking 
a multilateral solution through the United Nations as far back as 1998.  
Thus, the research objective of this project is relevant considering not only the important 
scope of the discussion of cybersecurity to the contemporary dynamics of International Relations, 
but also because it offers several new theoretical explanations within the developing cybersecurity 
framework, such as Offense-Defense theory, the principle of Soft Balancing, and Soft Power to 
analyze behavior and trends of bilateral/multilateral actions of the nations regarding global issues. 
As demonstrated, the motivations explaining the importance of this project work are 
numerous. Therefore, these motivations will be discussed and further explained throughout the 
work.   
 
2.2 Project Design 
To answer the problem addressed, this project is structured in six main sections as follows: 
1. Introduction: this section is the guideline, which drives the whole project because it 
presents the problem area and problem formulation chosen related to U.S. and 
Russian motivations in the cybersecurity policy arena. In addition, it addresses the 
research questions, which the project aims to answer.  
 
2. Methodology: this section is related to the methods chosen to support the project. The 
project is inspired by the “Critical Rationalist” approach, whereby relevant theories 
will first be presented before the analysis and it will support the discussion related to 
the problem formulation. Therefore, it presents the importance of qualitative and 
quantitative methods applied to answer the research question. This section also 
                                                          
5 One example of this data is the “Cyberthreat Real-Time Map”, a “real-time” map developed by the cybersecurity 
company, Kaspersky, which presents the network of the cyberattacks in the world, and it  has daily showing the U.S. 
as the principal cyberattack target country. The real-time information can be accessed in: 
https://cybermap.kaspersky.com/stats/ 
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presents the literature review of the main concepts discussed in the project such as 
Cybersecurity (and its derivations), Great Powers, and Nature of International 
Agreements (Multilateral/Bilateral), these conceptual clarifications are fundamental 
to clearly understand the terms and ideas developed through the project. Lastly, the 
delimitations of the project will be outlined.  
 
3. Theory: In this section, the theories responsible for guiding the analysis will be 
presented and clarified. Offense-Defense Theory, Soft Balancing, and Soft Power 
will be utilized in an attempt to understand the motivating factors guiding the relative 
behavior of the actors being researched in this project.  
 
4. Background: this section aims to present a brief overview of the development of the 
Internet and how this has led to the current cybersecurity issues in the international 
context; an introduction of how the Internet is regulated as it relates to concerns of 
different actors; and a concise overview of conceptual and ideological differences of 
the main actors regarding how they perceive the Internet and cybersecurity. 
 
5. Analysis: the analysis seeks to answer the problem formulation by presenting several 
different theories in an attempt to explain why the United States has reacted against 
efforts by Russia and China to promote a multilateral solution to cybersecurity issues. 
Three theories, Offense-Defense, Soft Balancing, and Soft Power will be used to 
extrapolate motivations of relevant actors.  
      
6. Conclusions: this section presents a summary of the ideas and concepts proffered in 
the project and the final conclusion to the topic proposed.  
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2.3 Choice of Methods 
The methods chosen to develop this project are qualitative in nature. As opposed to 
quantitative research, which is based mainly in numerical analysis, qualitative research “provides 
detailed description and analysis of the quality, or the substance, of the human experience” 
(Marvasti 2004, 10-11). In addition, according to Marvasti (2004, 15), the reported 
object/problem is analyzed based in the context in which it is located. Finally, “qualitative 
research tends to be more focused on the reflexive, or the give-and-take relationship, between 
social theory and methods” (Marvasti 2004, 15). Thus, it is important to analyze context, such as 
the historical background and theoretical framework as it will be developed in this project, in 
order to understand how nations tend to react with regard to the cybersecurity aspect. The 
previously mentioned aspects frame this project as qualitative research based. 
This project is characterized as a literature and documentary research. The literature 
research is related to the review of published literature about the studied topic though books, 
magazines and other publications (Lakatos 1992). The main goal of this data collection technique 
is to make the author familiar with the literature already written about the chosen research 
question. (ibid.). The “documentary research method refers to the analysis of documents 
that contain information about the phenomenon we wish to study” (Bailey 1994 and Mogalakwe 
2009, 44).  Through this method, is possible to “investigate and categorize physical sources, most 
commonly written documents, whether in the private or public domain” (Payne  and Payne  2004; 
Mogalakwe 2009, 44). 
The nature of the data is secondary, once any interview or field research will be applied to 
the project. According to Walliman (2006, 52), “secondary data is data that has been interpreted 
and recorded”.  In addition to these types of data, the work will also make use of the Case Study 
approach to apply the problem to a real context. In this case, the project is addressing the problem 
of cybersecurity in the specific context of the United Nations and the position of the U.S. and 
Russia in this case. According to Yin (2009, 4) “as a research method, the case study is used in 
many situations, to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social 
political, and related phenomena”. 
Meanwhile, some statistical data is used in the project. However, this research cannot be 
classified as quantitative, once this data is used to support the analyses made though qualitative 
sources presenting precise data related to the cybersecurity issue. 
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The work is supported by Offense-Defense, Soft Balancing, and Soft Power theories to 
explain how nations tend to behave according to their position in the international system. This 
theoretical framework helps to explain how states behave in a system characterized by polarity, 
in which they must act to preserve their status and prevent loss of power. The theoretical 
approaches chosen will be explained more deeply in the following section of the project.  
 
2.4 Concept Clarifications  
In this section, relevant terms within our framework of analysis will be clarified in order 
to allow for discussion of the cybersecurity field. This will include technical explanations for 
concepts such as cyberspace, cybersecurity, cyber threats, cyber terrorism, cyber warfare, 
cyberattacks, cyber intelligence, cybercrime, cyber law, as well as general concepts for the 
theoretical analysis, such as Great Powers and the nature of International Agreements. 
 
2.4.1 Cyberspace  
Cyberspace is the environment characterized by the use of electronic and electromagnetic 
devices to receive, modify, and share information and data through IT networks. It is a virtual 
(not material) space, where people can communicate and connect with each other by way of 
computers or other electronic devices. The term was originally coined by the Canadian author 
William Gibson in the early 1980’s in order to describe the whole system of virtual realities. This 
space is not limited by borders and can maintain connection between individuals from all over the 
world as long as they have access to an Internet connection. In recent times, the term ‘cyberspace’ 
is often used interchangeably with or referred to simply as the ‘Internet’ (Batty and Barr 1994). 
Currently, cyberspace and its infrastructure is still very vulnerable from a large array of 
risks and a lot of possible attacks. Both single individuals and nation-states use this vulnerability 
to illegally steal information, money, intellectual copyrights, economic-financial and other 
important data from banks, other nation states, armies, in many cases single persons and so forth. 
The main challenge for the institutions and many governments is then to tackle this problem trying 
to decrease the level of threats, creating new elaborate systems of protection against the 
cyberattacks through strong cybersecurity structures (Kostopoulos 2013). 
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2.4.2 Cybersecurity  
The term ‘cybersecurity’ refers to the branch of cyberspace which deals with the analysis 
and formulation of the vulnerability, risks, threats, attacks and protection of the material integrity 
(aka hardware), and the logic-functional devices (software) of an IT system and the data that it 
contains (Voeller 2014). The protection can be obtained through different actions, which can 
guarantee the propriety of the data (integrity), confidentiality of the data (coding), login/access 
only to authorized users (authentication), and a more general system’s protection from the attack 
of malevolent software (e.g. malware).  
As it has been reported by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), presently 
cybersecurity is fundamental for ensuring the safety of an IT system or anything that is based on 
a technological structure, especially for a large number of factors like: “the ability of malicious 
actors to operate from anywhere in the world, the linkages between cyberspace and physical 
systems, and the difficulty of reducing vulnerabilities and consequences in complex cyber 
networks.” (DHS 2015)  
 Moreover, one of the biggest threats is the constant and quick evolution and development 
of new cyber mechanisms or malware created by hackers, which are able to attack, penetrate and 
harm even a very sophisticated cybersecurity system (e.g. the Sony cyberattack in November 
2014). These situations have precipitated the creation of institutional (and also non-institutional) 
committees tasked with combating the hackers work and promoting the cybersecurity (in the U.S. 
for example, the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency -  HSARPA has been 
created). 
 
2.4.3 Cyber Threats 
 “In today’s cybersecurity landscape, it is not possible to prevent all attacks or breaches; 
today’s attackers have significant funding, are patient and sophisticated, and target vulnerabilities 
in people and process as well as technology.” (EY Journal 2014) 
 Many national and international organizations are relying more and more on digital 
information and shared data, but in doing this their intellectual proprieties, secret decisions and 
sensitive data are increasingly exposed to some threats. The cyber threats for an organization (or 
individuals) are referred to as the unauthorized access of a person/group into the control IT 
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system. This prohibited access can be done from the inside of the organization (espionage) or 
from remote locations, as long as there is an Internet connection between the servers. The cyber 
threats for the control and IT systems can be originated by a large array of sources: hostile 
governments, terrorist groups, or individual hackers. This is the reason why it’s necessary to get 
and apply a proper and strong cybersecurity to the IT system for whatever organization, 
government or individual. (Kumar et al, 2005). 
 
2.4.4 Cyber warfare 
As a result of new technologies and sophisticated hi-tech, war can now be fought in 
cyberspace and without the use of conventional weapons. According to the prestigious American 
non-profit think tank RAND, cyber warfare: “involves the actions by a nation-state or 
international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or 
information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks.” 
 Indeed the term cyber warfare refers to that group of activities for the preparation and 
management of the military operation performed and conditioned only with the help of the 
intelligent information. In concrete terms, this can be the interception, alteration or destruction of 
the information and of the enemies’ communications system. A journalist from TIME magazine 
attested, referring to the American government policies concerning the cyberspace and cyber 
warfare, that: “the biggest threat to national security these days comes not from aircraft carriers 
or infantry divisions, but a computer with a simple Internet connection. That much became clear 
after the catastrophic hack—most likely by a foreign power—of sensitive federal employee data 
stored online.” (Bremmer 2015).  
The new arms race is then no longer fought with the proliferation of new weapons or the 
production of bigger and more damaging bombs, but on the hoarding of smarter, faster and better-
equipped hackers and IT technicians.  
 
2.4.5 Cyberattacks 
 Cyberattacks can be defined as any offensive maneuver used by individuals, groups, 
organizations or another nation-state against any other IT system, infrastructure, network of 
computers or electronic device with the aim to steal, alter, or destroy a specific target. One of the 
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most recent examples is the campaign launched during the summer 2015 by the famous 
international hackers group called Anonymous through a cybernetic attack against the ISIS server, 
knocking out most of the websites used by the terrorist group for propaganda purposes and 
damaging the IT systems in their headquarters (Tzach 2015; Shiloach 2015). 
Cyberattacks have become more sophisticated and dangerous and this is a constantly 
developing phenomena that is very hard to control (Karnouskos 2011). Therefore there are various 
types of cyberattacks that can be:  
 
- cyberattack to critical infrastructure: like energy or hydraulic plants, or communication, 
business and transportation headquarters.  
- cyberattack as mere web vandalism with the aim to attack and modify a specific webpage 
(also known as defacement of a webpage). 
- cyberattack of the military, also known as equipment disruption, focused on the alteration 
of computers and satellites used by the armies. This type of cyberattack can be very 
dangerous when orders are intercepted and changed, threatening people and countries.    
- cyberattack of the memories of data and sensitive information. This is made mainly 
through espionage techniques.   
- cyberattack of an IT system with the hidden scope to act a psychological war through 
putting onto the web subliminal messages and propaganda notices.  
 
2.4.6 Cyber Intelligence 
Cyber intelligence is any kind of activity which monitors, analyzes and neutralizes digital 
threats. Cyber intelligence is often related to espionage activities but nowadays it has become 
something more clear and is also used by civilians  (Goel 2011). In fact there are different agencies 
that deal with the security and control of  cyberspace (e.g. Deloitte – cyber intelligence center). 
The task of cyber intelligence is to contribute to the fight against viruses, hackers and terrorists 
which threaten the safety of cyberspace. For governments it’s fundamental to be ready for a 
possible cyberattack and by the use of a well-structured system of cyber intelligence and 
cybersecurity it’s possible to search, catch and send back to the sender any cyber threats.   
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 In certain cases it is still required to adapt the cyber intelligence techniques to the ordinary 
espionage operations (Goel 2011) in order to fulfill a high level of data gathering and collect as 
much information as possible. 
 
2.4.7 Cybercrime 
 According to Interpol’s definition: “Cybercrime is a fast-growing area of crime. More and 
more criminals are exploiting the speed, convenience and anonymity of the Internet to commit a 
diverse range of criminal activities that know no borders, either physical or virtual (Interpol 
2015).” This definition made by Interpol shows that cybercrime is something that can touch every 
aspect of cyberspace. In fact there are three major types of cybercrime: cybercrime committed 
against computer hardware and software, cybercrime employed for financial crimes and 
corruption, and cybercrime accomplished to abuse someone or something. 
Cybercrime is a developing phenomenon and growing threat for governments, 
organizations and individuals. During the past decades cybercrime was operated mostly by single 
persons or small hacker groups—according to the statements of Interpol and of the monitoring 
centers (e.g. Norton software antivirus and Internet Security), the criminal organizations which 
deal and work with professionals of the sector are increasing day-by-day. New technologies and 
the high speed of the Internet and of connections can lead to bigger and stronger networks of 
cybercriminals from all over the world in real time.  
Cyberspace is then becoming the new war field where armies and police forces fight 
against troops of hackers, terrorists and criminals (Kramer et. al 2009). 
 
2.4.8 Cyber Law 
The increasing use of cyberspace as a “new reality” couldn’t avoid the creation of a series 
of cyber laws or  IT laws and Internet laws. Cyber laws comprehend a series of laws, regulations 
and jurisprudence with the goal to regulate and control the use of the Internet and software. Cyber 
laws are mostly engaged with copyright and digital information; nonetheless they can also be 
employed for the defense of privacy, intellectual freedom and underage protection (Elkin-Koren 
1996). 
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Some governments have already adopted their national cyber laws; the United States for 
example have already put into force a series of regulations and created a specialized section in the 
Department of Justice, the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS). The scope 
of the regulation is to strengthen the security of the cyberspace and protect the systems of the 
government, banks, and companies from cyberattacks.  
 
2.4.9 Great Powers 
For more than three hundred years, the drama of modern history has turned on the 
rise and fall of great powers. In the multipolar era, twelve great powers appeared 
on the scene at one time or another. At the beginning of World War II, seven 
remained; at its conclusion, two. Always before, as some states sank, others rose 
to take their places. World War II broke the pattern; for the first time in a world of 
sovereign states, bipolarity prevailed. (Waltz 1993). 
 
The history and the concept of Great Powers is a fundamental part in the study of the 
International Relations; recently cybersecurity has become part of it and it’s very important to 
consider what kind of cybersecurity is pursued by the current Great Powers and the relations that 
occur between them at the global level. It’s well known that since the creation of the UN, a long 
list of treaties and agreements have been ratified which concern many and different areas. 
However, it seems that thus far none of the Great Powers has been able (or willing) to find a final 
and common agreement related to cyberspace. In order to make an additional clarification, the 
definitions and differences between multilateral and bilateral agreements will be mentioned.  
 
2.4.10 Multilateral agreements 
According to the Treaty Handbook of the United Nations a multilateral treaty is: 
An international agreement concluded between three or more subjects of 
international law, each possessing treaty-making capacity […] Thus a sovereign 
State or an international organization with treaty-making capacity can be a party 
to a treaty or international agreement. Many international organizations 
established by treaty or international agreement have been specifically or 
implicitly conferred treaty-making capacity […] However, an international entity 
by treaty or agreement may not necessarily have the capacity to conclude treaties.” 
(UN Treaty Handook 2012,  30-33). 
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2.4.11 Bilateral agreements 
Using again the Treaty Handbook of the United Nations, the differences between bilateral 
and multilateral agreements can be witnessed: 
A bilateral treaty is an international agreement concluded between two subjects of 
international law, each possessing treaty-making process (see above). In some 
situations, several States or organizations may join together to form one party. 
There is no standard form for a bilateral treaty. An essential element of a bilateral 
treaty is that both parties have reached agreement on its content. Accordingly, 
reservations and declarations are generally inapplicable to bilateral agreements.” 
(ibid., 33).  
 
2.5 Delimitations 
Cybersecurity is a strategic issue to all states. Considering this, a large amount of data 
available is made so at the behest of a particular nation-state and therefore reflects this relative 
bias, if the data is available at all. It can be assumed that any data of a sensitive nature or with the 
potential to be exploited by those actors wishing to do harm will be classified and unavailable. In 
addition, due to the nature of the authoritarian regimes and their policy stances regarding the free 
flow of information, it is comparatively more difficult to find information and data from Russia 
and its allies than from the United States.  
Furthermore, cybersecurity it is a relatively new subject in the International Relations area, 
so historical data is limited, with very little relevant information before the start of the Cold War 
(during the 1960’s), when the technological advances related to the Internet and 
telecommunications in general gained strength, particularly between the two states on which this 
project is focused, the U.S. and Russia. On the other hand, just as technology is rapidly 
developing, so is the debate on how to secure oneself from it. Because of the incredibly dynamic 
and changing nature of the topic, the findings of this project could be irrelevant and outdated 
before it is even complete. 
Finally, there is still no international multilateral agreement for cybersecurity and all the 
effective discussions remain in the bilateral sphere, so it is difficult to predict what could happen 
if the Russian proposal became reality and a multilateral agreement for cybersecurity at the level 
of the United Nations entered into force. However, with regard to the analysis in this study, the 
potential scope of findings does not intend to provide any policy recommendations or solution to 
the cybersecurity dilemma. 
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3 THEORY 
 
This project will take advantage of several different theories to make sense of the behavior 
of the United States and its adversaries in the cybersecurity arena. While these theories are not 
incompatible, they explain different aspects of the problem, which is extremely complex and 
multifaceted.  The first theory is known as Offense-Defense theory, or the Offense-Defense 
balance. It is mainly used to explain the conditions necessary to facilitate cooperation in matters 
of conflict between states occupying different positions in the international system. 
Concerning the debates related to the relations among these states in the contemporary 
world, the U.S. has maintained its status of hegemon and has shaped the world after the Cold War 
(Nye 2010; Art 2003; Keohene 1984). Along these lines, “by virtue of its preponderant military 
and economic power relative to the other states in the system, the hegemon is able to exert power 
and influence over those states” (Jesse et al. 2012, 1). According to the position a hegemonic 
country – the United States – occupies, it models the behavior and the strategies of the other 
countries as a response to their secondary position in the international arena. Essentially, the 
second-tier countries (Paul 2005) need to balance6 the dominant position of one single Nation 
State to be able to act and to take part in the international decisions. In this degree, raises the 
concept of the Soft Balancing theory, where countries – once acting peripherally – can find 
strategies to balance the power of a hegemonic country in a soft way7 making use of institutions, 
multilateral agreements and diplomacy to succeed at the international level (Pape 2005; Paul 
2005).  
                                                          
6 “Balancing is about equalizing the odds in a contest between the strong and the weak. States balance when they 
take action intended to make it hard for strong states to use their military advantage against others. The goal can be 
to deter a strong state from attacking or to reduce its prospects of victory in war. Traditional 
hard balancing seeks to change the military balance in an actual or (more often) potential conflict by contributing 
military capabilities to the weaker side through measures such as a military buildup, war-ªghting alliance, or transfer 
of military technology to an ally” (PAPE, 2005, p. 36). 
 
7 A soft strategy is related to make use of agreements, diplomacy and non-military actions to influence the 
international system in opposition of a hard strategy, which is related to economic and military use of force. 
According to Pape (2005), “soft balancing differs from soft power, which refers to the ability of (some) states to use 
the attractiveness of their social, cultural, economic, or political resources to encourage other governments 
and publics to accept policies favorable toward their state, society, and policies.” (Pape, 2005 17). The concept of 
soft power will be further presented in this chapter.  
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Furthermore, it is important to highlight U.S. soft power strategies, strongly explored by 
the country and, which help to explain the motivations of the position of the country considering 
cybersecurity matters. “Although uses of soft power are not limited to security issues, in principle 
a state with excellent soft-power resources might be in a better than average position to organize 
a balancing coalition (or to prevent the formation of one against it)” (Pape 2005, 17). As stated 
by Pape (2005), soft-power can also be seen as a complement to a soft balancing strategy, even 
both of them being different in their concepts. “In general, however, soft power is an attribute of 
a state, whereas soft balancing involves the nonmilitary policies that states can use to limit and 
offset the leading state in the international system” (Pape 2005, 17).  
Taking into account the hegemonic status of the United States in the contemporary world 
and the second-tier position of Russia, and considering the U.S. has strongly applied the concepts 
of Offense-Defense theory, as well as Soft Power theory in its foreign policy, this section will 
explain the theoretical framework based on the assumptions of these theories. This frame will 
form the basis of analysis of the motivations that bring Russia to advocate for international 
cooperation on cybersecurity measures, while the United States has been passive at this 
multilateral level.  
 
3.1 Offense-Defense Theory 
This theory, as proposed by Robert Jervis in his paper entitled “Cooperation under the 
Security Dilemma,” is used to explain how, even in the case when all actors involved rank 
cooperation and disarmament as their first choice, the opposite can occur (1978, 167). By using 
an analogy of a group of people hunting a stag, but who also have the option to defect and chase 
a lesser prize of a rabbit, he describes how an actor will not cooperate unless he believes all others 
will do the same, even when he knows that their first choices are identical. This can be due to a 
lack of understanding between parties, inability to control impulses, or perhaps thinking that other 
members of the groups are unreliable (ibid.).  
As he describes, “if one person voices any of these suspicions, others are more likely to 
fear he will defect, thus making them more likely to defect, thus making it more rational for him 
to defect (ibid.; 168).” While this theory was originally intended for application to conventional 
warfare, it is very relevant in describing the dilemma faced by trying to achieve cybersecurity. As 
described by Jervis, the security dilemma occurs when in the quest to make oneself more secure, 
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an actor unintentionally decreases the security of other states. The classic example is that one 
state, fearing an attack from a rival, decides to build up his army; the other state, originally having 
no intention of attacking, witnesses the other state’s increase in forces and builds up its army in 
response. This confirms the first state’s fears, putting them on the path to conflict even though 
neither state had any intention of fighting in the first place.  
There are many factors that determine the likelihood such an arms race will occur. 
According to Jervis, the two most important considerations are whether defensive and offensive 
weapons and policies can be easily distinguished, and whether offense or defense has the 
advantage. The security dilemma is most severe in instances where the offense has the advantage, 
and weapons cannot easily be distinguished. As Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann elaborate, 
it is impossible for states of the same size to experience high levels of security simultaneously, 
because any time one state adds to their forces, the other state will have to add much more to their 
defenses in order to maintain the balance (1998, 48-49). When offense has the advantage, war 
will be quick and potentially profitable, which further adds to the motivation of greedy states to 
begin a conflict (ibid, 49). In the case of cybersecurity, offense undoubtedly has the advantage. 
While it is easy to attack another actor, it is incredibly difficult to predict how an attack might 
come in order to shore up the defenses and prevent it. This is due to the ever-evolving technology 
utilized in cyberattacks.   
In his article entitled “Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance,” Ilai Saltzman 
adapts this theory to the cyber arena. As he describes, “the balance between offence and defense 
is determined, in the traditional fashion, according to two key factors: mobility enhancement and 
firepower’s degree of destructiveness (2013, 43).” He recommends updating the traditional 
determinants of mobility and firepower to ‘versatility’ and ‘Byte power’ to account for the cyber 
threat. As he elaborates, 
ICT induced capabilities tilt the Offense-Defense balance in favour of the offense, 
not in the prospects of gaining and maintaining control over territory and material 
resources as a manifestation of victory, but rather in the actual possibility to 
paralyze the enemies military deployment and civilian preparedness and 
drastically limit its retaliatory potential (2013, 44). 
 
One of the most widely agreed upon factors favoring offensive war is that of ‘mobility’; 
that is, being able to rapidly mobilize forces (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 62). Historically, 
advancements in mobility capabilities have been followed with an increased amount of conflict. 
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Saltzman argues that versatility of cyber weapons has the same connotations in determining the 
propensity for cyberwar. He defines versatility as the “capacity to technologically attack different 
types of ICT-based targets at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels” (Saltzman 2013, 43). 
Likewise, he suggests that a cyber weapon’s Byte power, rather than firepower, will determine 
whether offense has the advantage. While firepower is a weapon’s degree of accuracy and 
destructiveness, Byte power is the “degree of technological damage that can be inflicted on the 
enemy’s ICT-based infrastructure” (ibid, 44). 
In discussing cyber capabilities in these terms, it demonstrates why they so strongly favor 
offensive use. By updating the usual determinants of offensive strengths of mobility and firepower 
to versatility and ‘Byte power’, the Offense-Defense balance theory can be applied to the cyber 
arena and explain state’s behavior therein. It is necessary to take this theory into consideration 
because it has been influential in determining the United States’ cyberpolicy. According to 
William J. Lynn, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, the US believes cyberwar to be asymmetric 
because the low cost of computing devices means adversaries can pose significant threats to US 
military capabilities. As he elaborates: 
In cyberspace, the offense has the upper hand. The Internet was designed to be 
collaborative and rapidly expandable and to have low barriers to technological 
innovation; security and identity management were lower priorities. For these 
structural reasons, the U.S. government's ability to defend its networks always lags 
behind its adversaries' ability to exploit U.S. networks' weaknesses (2010). 
 
 The Offense-Defense balance is considered by many to be a rather optimistic view of the 
international system, because it assumes that there are particular circumstances, i.e. when defense 
has the advantage, in which war is unlikely (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 44). This theory, along 
with its modifications for the cyber realm, will be applied to gain insight into the factors 
motivating the behavior of those states analyzed in this project. It can perhaps offer insight as to 
why these states may or may not be seeking an international solution. 
 
3.2 The concept of Soft Balancing theory 
First of all, it is important to clarify why states tend to follow a soft strategy in order to 
choose a hard strategy against the hegemony. To follow this frame, Pape (2005) argues “although 
it has fought numerous wars, the United States has generally used its power to preserve the 
established political order in major regions of the world, seeking to prevent other powers from 
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dominating rather than seeking to dominate itself” (Pape 2005, 9).  In addition, Paul (2005) states 
that “since the end of the Cold War, second-tier major powers such as China, France, Germany, 
India, and Russia have mostly abandoned traditional “hard balancing” – based on countervailing 
alliances and arms buildups – at the systemic level (Paul 2005, 47)” in opposition of the U.S.. 
Fighting a war is costly in several aspects to an individual state actor and at the multiple level, it 
is uncertain to operate collectively. Therefore, absent the fear of an attack from the U.S., the 
second-tier major powers were able to come up with alternative ways of balancing power (Paul 
2005).  
So, instead of a military aggression and the use of hard strategies, Pape (2005) states that 
“major powers are likely to adopt what I call “soft-balancing” measures: that is, actions that do 
not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, 
frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies” (10). The author also argues 
that “soft-balancing measures” were already used throughout international institutions, economic 
statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements by the international opposition related to the U.S. war in 
Iraq (Pape 2005, 10).  It is important to note that “soft balancing could eventually evolve into hard 
balancing” (Pape 2005, 10) when it concerns to indirectly increase the economic power of a 
nation-state thought a soft strategy.  
However, following the ideas of Pape (2005), it is important to highlight that soft balancing 
is not a “destiny”: it is a reaction of the second-level states to the U.S. foreign policy position of 
aggressive unilateralism.  
Also, according to the principles of Soft Balancing, states concerned with balancing power 
relative to a unipolar leader only have a possibility to do so at the “external” level, forming 
counterbalancing alliances, for example8 (Pape 2005, 15). So, it is not possible to balance power 
against a unipolar leader by one state alone: second-raked states need to take use of coalitions and 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 “Against a unipolar leader, however, internal balancing is not a viable option because no increase in standing 
military forces or economic strength by just one state is adequate to the task. This follows from the definition of a 
unipolar world and not from specific details about individual states’ capabilities” (PAPE, 2005, p. 15). 
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This means that buckpassing is not an option. Because no one state—by 
definition—is powerful enough to balance a sole superpower, no state is available 
to catch the buck. […] Thus, the logic of balancing against a sole superpower is a 
game of coordination in which assuring timely cooperation is the principal 
obstacle. In this situation, each member of a potential balancing coalition is best 
off cooperating with others to balance the unipolar leader. At the same time, each 
member’s decision to balance depends on the expectation that others will also 
balance, which in turn depends on the others’ expectations of its balancing 
behavior (Pape 2005, 16-17). 
 
Most important, soft balancing can establish a basis of cooperation for more forceful, hard-
balancing measures in the future. The logic of balancing against a sole superpower is about 
coordinating expectations of collective action among a number of second-ranked states. In the 
short term, this encourages states to pursue balancing strategies that are more effective at 
developing a convergence of expectations than in opposing the military power of the leading state. 
Building cooperation with nonmilitary tools is an effective means for this end (Pape 2005, 17-
18). 
3.2.1 How Soft Balancing works 
Pape (2005) argues that “balancing can involve the utilization of tools to make a superior 
state’s military forces harder to use without directly confronting that state’s power with one’s own 
forces” (36). Even soft balancing relying on non-military aggression and tools, it can affect 
militarily the superior state (36). Meanwhile, according to the author, the mechanisms of Soft 
Balancing are territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of 
resolve to participating in a balancing coalition. Pape (2005) states that all these steps can reduce 
the military force of that the superior state can use against the weaker one.  
 
Territorial denial: Restricting the access of its territory, the weaker country can affect the 
Superior states once they use these territories as “staging areas for ground forces or as transit for 
air and naval forces” (2005, 36).  
 
Entangling diplomacy: “Even strong states do not have complete freedom to ignore either 
the rules and procedures of important international organizations or accepted diplomatic practices 
without losing substantial support for their objectives” (2005, 36). In addition, making use of 
international organizations and punctual diplomatic actions can benefit weaker states, once a 
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stronger nation is willing to attack or initiate a war, this maneuver can give more time to the 
weaker nation be prepare for this. In case of the superior state being a democracy, “entangling 
diplomacy works not only by affecting the balance of military capabilities that can be brought to 
bear in the dispute but also by strengthening domestic opposition to possible adventures within 
the superior state” (2005, 36-37). 
 
Economic Strengthening: States target of the balancing attempts frequently have their 
military power derivate from their strong economic power.  “One way of balancing effectively, 
at least in the long run, would be to shift relative economic power in favor of the weaker side” 
(2005, 37). Weaker states can seek this goal by taking force of regional trading blocs and 
agreements excluding the participation of the greater state.  
 
Signals of resolve to balance: the biggest concern of weaker countries is that the collective 
action will not happen. If some second-ranked states can cooperate against the unipolar state, they 
can influence other weaker states to cooperate in the attempt of balancing the power against the 
stronger country. “If multiple states can cooperate, repeatedly, in some of the types of measures 
listed above, they may gradually increase their trust in each other’s willingness to cooperate 
against the unipolar leader’s ambitions” (2005, 37). The main goal of soft balancing is not to force 
other states to go against the super power, or even to stop the super power actions; “but to 
demonstrate resolve in a manner that signals a commitment to resist the superpower’s future 
ambitions” (2005, 37). The strategy to succeed in soft balancing is not to impede or to limit the 
super powers actions, but make the efforts sufficient to attract more states in the goal of soft 
balancing against the state leader.   
 
3.3 The concept of Soft Power 
In the actual international system, superpowers are less capable of utilizing their traditional 
power resources – such as military strength - to achieve their goals than in the past. In many 
aspects, private actors and small states are becoming more powerful. According to Nye (1990), 
there are at least five trends, which have contributed to this diffusion of power: “economic 
interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and 
changing political issues” (160). Thus, as the actors are changing, their interests are also altering. 
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In the traditional view of the international system, states gave priority to the military security to 
guarantee their sovereignty.  
Nowadays, countries need to consider new dimensions of security; military strategies have 
high costs and this is giving space to new strategies. For example, “modern telecommunications 
are instantaneous, and satellites and fiber-optic cables have led to a tenfold increase in overseas 
telephone calls in the last decade. The declining costs of transportation and communications have 
revolutionized global markets” (Nye 1990, 161). In addition, international trade has increased 
growth of global production and has become more important to some economies, and the 
expansion of Euro changed drastically the international financial market (Nye, 161).  
As one can see, international politics are changing, and this is resulting in important 
intangible forms of power. National coercion, culture universalization, and international 
institutions “are taking on additional significance. Power is passing from the ‘capital-rich’ to the 
‘information-rich’ (Nye 1990, 164). Those who have the information, have each day more power, 
especially before this information is spread around. “Thus a capacity for timely response to new 
information is a critical power resource” (164).  
These changes in the international system have directly affected the nature of power. 
According to Nye (1990, 167), power is becoming less transferable, less coercive, and less 
tangible. “Co-optative power – getting others to want what you want – and soft power resources 
– cultural attraction, ideology, and international institution – are not new” (Nye 1990, 197), and 
they have their power increased. For example, after the second war, the Soviet Union obtained 
positive results from soft power strategies as the spread of communist ideas such as the myth of 
inevitability, and the transnational communist institutions. However, the importance of the co-
optative and soft power has increased even more nowadays. The presented trends suggest a new 
way of exercising power over its traditional meaning. A country can achieve its goal because other 
countries want to follow this country. When it happens, co-optative or soft power emerges, in 
contrast with the “hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants” (Nye 1990, 
166). The United States has a strong co-optative power against other states: its institutions 
governing the “international economy, such as the International Monetary Fund and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, tend to embody liberal, free-market principles that coincide in 
large measure with  
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American society and ideology” (Nye 1990, 168). According to Nye (2002), there are a 
fundamental difference between hard power and soft power. Military power, such as economic 
one, are examples of hard command that can be applied in order to induce the others to change 
their positions. Hard power is based in inducements and threats (8). On the other hand, soft power 
is an indirect way to exercise power. As stated by the author:  
A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want 
to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and 
openness. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others 
as it is to force them change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This 
aspect of power – getting others to do what you want – I call soft power. It co-opts people rather 
than coerces them (Nye 2002, 9)  
Soft power is also derived from the values of the countries, such as culture, internal policies 
and foreign policy. This fact makes soft power harder to measure and control. According to 
Védrine (2001), Americans are powerful because they are able to “inspire the dreams and desires 
of others, thanks to the mastery of global images though film and television and because, for the 
same reasons, large numbers of students from other countries come to the United States to finish 
their studies” (Védrine 2001, 3).  
Soft power is as important as hard power. If a state is able to legitimize this power to the 
other countries, it can face less resistance against the wishes of the others. If its culture and 
ideology are attractive, the other countries will follow it voluntarily. In this sense, the American 
culture in an important resource of the U.S. soft power. It is obvious that many people are not 
attracted by the American ideals and by the historical hard power used by the country throughout 
history. However, the popular culture, intrinsic in the U.S. exported products and international 
propaganda, has a generalized appeal that reaches people in different ways. Young Japanese – 
even if they have never been in the U.S. – wearing their “sports jackets with the names of 
American colleges [...]. Similarly, Soviet teenagers wear blue jeans and seek American 
recordings, and Chinese students used a symbol modeled on the Statue of Liberty, during the 1989 
uprisings” (Nye 1990, 169). Moreover, American television shows are exported to the whole 
world and Hollywood is the biggest movie industry in the world, while English became the 
universal language to communicate all over the world.  
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According to Nye (2002), soft power, however, is more than just cultural influence, “the 
values our government champions in its behavior at home (for example, democracy), in 
international institutions (listening to others), and in foreign policy (promoting peace and human 
rights) also affect the preferences of others. We can attract (or repel) others by the influence of 
our example” (Nye 2002, 11). In addition, the author states that the most part of the soft power if 
unrelated with the American government and it is just a piece of its proposals (ibid., 12). 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4 BACKGROUND  
 
In order to understand how the United States and Russia have reacted to cybersecurity 
threats differently, we must first explore the very different manners in which cyber technology 
evolved in these disparate nations. This reveals important insight into current positions on the 
matter.  
 
4.1 Creation of the Internet 
“The Internet is the first thing that humanity has built that humanity doesn’t understand; 
the largest experience in anarchy that we have ever had.” 
 (Eric Schmidt, Former Microsoft CEO) 
 
Individuals born in recent generations can scare imagine life without the Internet. It 
permeates so many aspects of daily life that the thought of conducting day-to-day affairs without 
the vast wealth of information available at our fingertips is painful. But the Internet as we know 
it had much humbler beginnings. During the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Defense 
established the Advanced Research Projects Agency (APRA) as a means to maintain a technical 
edge over the Soviet Union (Everard 2000, 12). After the Cuban Missile Crisis, APRA sponsored 
research into how communications could remain intact after a nuclear explosion, and the resulting 
paper by the RAND Corporation, entitled ‘On Distributed Communications Networks’ became 
the theoretical groundwork of the Internet (Everard 2000, 12). By 1969, the computers between 
the University of California- Los Angeles and Stanford University had been successfully linked 
and the connection between them, known as ‘Internetworking’ eventually became simply 
‘Internet’ (Reveron 2012, 8). What was initially research funded as a way to communicate in case 
of a disruption of communications (potentially as a result of nuclear attack) remained firmly in 
the realm of researchers and scientists for some thirty years (ibid.). 
This all changed when Tim Berners-Lee, an English scientist working for CERN, created 
the World Wide Web in the late 1980’s (Timberg 2015, 7). This finally brought the Internet to the 
public domain and also set in motion the mass scale public use, which would in the future make 
cyber threats especially dangerous. In 1990, only three million people were active users of the 
Internet, and all of these users were located either in the U.S. or in Western Europe. Today, there 
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are nearly three billion users in every corner of the earth (Internet Society Report, 2014). The 
ever-increasing number of Internet users means there are infinitely more vulnerabilities and also 
infinitely more actors capable of committing cybercrime.   
 
4.2 Who ‘Governs’ the Internet? 
Naturally with all the vulnerability, states have an interest in trying to control what goes 
on on the Internet. This is not only for security, but also for economic and political reasons. As 
mentioned before, however, the Internet is difficult to control. What regulation does go on is 
known as ‘Internet governance’. Internet governance is becoming a source of conflict between 
states just as global trade and environmental policy (Mueller 2010, 1). While the creators of the 
Internet viewed it as an intellectual network that belonged to everyone, as the Internet spread to 
more and more places, it had to relate to autonomous states that didn’t necessarily share this view 
and sought to benefit from the Internet as a resource. These states have been engaged in 
(sometimes contentious) political strategies to access resources for decades, sometimes even 
centuries, and some choose to fight for advantage within this mindset (ibid.).  
 According to the World Summit on Information Society, the definition of Internet 
governance is “the development and application by Governments, the private sector, and civil 
society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, 
and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.” When the Internet was in its 
infancy, governance only referred to the distribution of domain names and IP addresses. In 1994, 
the US National Science Foundation, who still controlled much of the key infrastructures of the 
Internet leased out the main naming task to the private US company called Network Solutions 
Inc. The Internet community was not pleased and it sparked a battle over regulation that was 
settled in 1998 with the establishment of the nongovernmental Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) (Kurbalija 2010, 8). 
 While this satisfied the critics for a while, the Internet continued growing and future 
debates took a more state-centric nature. Many were critical of the amount of Internet 
infrastructure located in the United States and the fact that while the ICANN was a non-
governmental entity, the ultimate power lay with the US Department of Commerce (Shackelford 
et. all 2015). The US announced plans to forfeit control of ICANN in 2009, but has thus far 
delayed following through with this pledge. Several states, especially Russia and China, have 
     
 
32 
 
continually advocated for more state-centric control of the governance function of the Internet, 
and have repeatedly championed an intergovernmental solution (ibid.).  
 
4.3 From ‘Old Crime’ to National Security Threat 
Almost as soon as the Internet began, users were able to ‘hack’ it. That is, gain 
unauthorized access to a computer system in order to steal data or change code. This was at first 
only a minor problem with so few users and relatively little motive to do so, but this changed as 
computers became more and more integrated into daily life (Yar, 2006). Eventually, criminals 
realized they could use the Internet to steal personal information, or commit the same crimes they 
had been committing throughout human history by other methods. The initial crimes were small 
scale, such as identity theft and fraud, and those unrelated to hacking such as utilizing virtual 
spaces to share child pornography or lure victims to a chosen location to commit violent crimes 
(ibid.). But as what people did online changed, so did the various ways in which these activities 
could be exploited.  
With the rise of E-commerce, or electronic business, the potential expanded. Businesses 
began using the Internet for routine activities such as ‘research and development, production, 
distribution, marketing, and sales’ (Yar 2006, 8). The criminal opportunities arising from this 
activity range from the theft of trade secrets and sensitive strategic information, to the disruption 
of online marketplaces, to credit card fraud (ibid.). While the Internet was a catalyst for the 
prevalence of these types of crimes, we must distinguish here between these types of activities, 
so called ‘computer assisted’ and ‘computer oriented’ crimes. The former are those, while 
facilitated and made easier by the structure and nature of the Internet, existed long before.  
In addition to private actors and businesses, political actors also expanded the ways in 
which they used the Internet to conduct their activities. These actors range from local and national 
governments, to political parties, to militaries, to terrorist organizations. When these actors began 
using the Internet to conduct their activities, they opened themselves to a whole new range of 
vulnerabilities. Most of the threats against these types of actors take the form of  ‘computer 
oriented’ attacks. These take the form of malicious software, denial of service attacks, and 
defacement of websites (Jewkes and Yar 2010, 3). The source of these attacks has been attributed 
to individual hackers, ‘hacktivist’ groups, and more recently to terrorist organizations. While 
‘computer assisted’ crimes are certainly concerns of governments, they are arguably more 
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concerned with those attacks that can cripple the infrastructure of the Internet, thereby bringing 
critical activities to a grinding halt.  
 
4.4 Summary of Major International Cyberattacks 
The very first such attack occurred in 1988. It was known as the Morris Worm, after its 
creator Robert Tapan Morris, and it spread mostly around U.S. computers, slowing them to the 
point of being unusable. Although the attack was not made with malicious intent, it showed just 
how vulnerable the network could be (DeNardis 2014, 88). There were other minor attacks since 
the Morris worm, but it has only been in the last decade that cyberattacks have increased in both 
number and severity.  
 In December 2006, the United States’ civilian space program (NASA) was hacked and it 
was reported that the newest plans for space launch vessels had been stolen by unknown foreign 
intruders (CSIS.org). In 2007, the Estonian government was plagued with denial of service 
attacks, at the suspected behest of the Russian government. While the attack did not critically 
incapacitate the Estonian government, it spread a wave of fear across well-connected countries 
about the potential harm of well executed cyberattacks. Around this time, the United States 
Department of Defense was also under siege. The unclassified emails of the Secretary of Defense 
were hacked by unknown foreign entities. Throughout 2007, there were complaints from the 
British, French, German, Chinese and U.S. governments about intrusions on their government 
networks (NATO).  
The cyber incidents continued in 2008. The databases of both U.S. presidential candidates 
were breeched, with large quantities of classified information being stolen. Shortly thereafter, the 
computer networks in Georgia were infiltrated whilst Georgia was in the midst of a traditional 
military conflict with Russia. The government websites were defaced (NATO). A similar situation 
occurred slightly thereafter in Israel, when their Internet infrastructure was targeted during a 
military offensive in the Gaza strip (ibid.).  
With the year 2010 came the sophisticated malware known as STUXNET and with it 
massive international attention. While it was found in Iran, Indonesia, and elsewhere the main 
target was largely suspected to be Iranian nuclear facilities (ibid.). A few months later the 
Canadian government reported a major cyberattack against its defense and economic agencies, 
forcing them to disconnect for a period of time until the breech could be controlled. The following 
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year, the “Red October” attack was discovered by a Russian firm. This attack was global in scale 
and the virus had been collecting data from countries across Europe, the former USSR and Central 
Asia, as well as North America. It had been operating undetected for at least five years before it 
was discovered. At the same time, six major banks suffered denial of service attacks, suspected 
to be perpetrated by Iranian hackers (ibid.).  
More attacks were reported in 2013, by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, major 
U.S. new agencies such as the New York Times, and German companies like Thyssen-Krupp 
(CSIS.org). However, the biggest revelation that year was the Edward Snowden incident. Former 
government employee Edward Snowden released thousands of documents incriminating the U.S. 
government of cyber espionage against both allies and enemies alike. In the aftermath, 
cyberattacks were numerous. They did not slow down in 2014, with several huge U.S. companies 
like Target and Home Depot suffering hacks and data theft that cost hundreds of millions of 
dollars (ibid.).  
Perhaps the most significant cyber event in 2014 was the attack against Sony. After filming 
a parody film in which the North Korean leader is assassinated, hackers infiltrated Sony Pictures, 
releasing terabytes of information to the public before wiping their computers. The attack was 
extremely damaging, and resulted in Sony cancelling the release of the film. The significance of 
this attack was in the U.S. Government’s response. They intervened in the attack of a private 
company, claiming it was an attack against the freedom of expression and therefore an attack 
against U.S. sovereignty. They publicly named North Korea as the perpetrator. This declaration 
was supported by a number of other world leaders (Timberg 2015). 
So far in 2015, the hack gaining the most attention is the one against the Office of 
Personnel Management in the United States, which involved the theft of the classified information 
of more than twenty million federal employees. The occurrences of cyberattacks appear to be 
gaining momentum. They are becoming not only more numerous, but more destructive, and 
targeting a larger number of victims (PwC 2015, 3). Those mentioned in the previous paragraphs 
are but a tiny representation of the vast number of attacks, which occurred all over the world, yet 
they suffice in demonstrating the global scale of the problem. Despite this, the responses of the 
United States and Russian governments have been very different.  
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4.5 United States Cybersecurity Policy 
The Government of the United States straddles a precarious line with regards to 
cybersecurity. While the U.S. military was a kind of benevolent benefactor in the creation of the 
Internet, those researchers and scientists who actually did the work were adamant that the Internet 
remain out of government control. The whole reason the Internet was created was so that scientists 
in different locations could access and build upon each others’ research. The essential nature of 
the Internet is “fast, open and frictionless” (Timberg 2015). When the creators of the Internet 
thought about security, they thought they could simply exclude anyone they thought was 
untrustworthy. They never imagined the users of the Internet would use it to attack each other 
(ibid.). This very nature of the Internet makes it incredibly difficult to constrain, being both free 
and open. But with the billions of Internet users today, everything has changed.  
Despite this, the original ideals shaping the creation of the Internet have held fast. The vast 
majority of networks are under civilian control, even those that are responsible for handling 
military communications. For the most part, the U.S. Government has strived to keep the Internet 
free and open, keeping with this tradition. It has advocated that the multistakeholder approach to 
governance, which is the current model, is the best option. However, as more and more critical 
infrastructure is regulated through the Internet, the vulnerabilities become greater. Today, power 
supplies, water supplies, traffic control centers, and other vital infrastructures are vulnerable to 
cyberattack. The government must therefore balance ‘staying out’ of the Internet with protecting 
those infrastructures, which, if attacked, could have devastating effects on the lives of its citizens.  
There has been a change in U.S. cyberpolicy in the past few years along with this shift to 
using the Internet to regulate critical infrastructure. As an OECD report concludes, U.S. 
cyberpolicy has shifted along with the role of Internet in society. When it was merely a “useful” 
tool in the conducting of activities of individuals and organizations, risks could be managed at 
this individual level. In recent years, however, it has evolved from being “useful” to being 
“essential” for the economy and society. Thus cyberpolicy must also seek to protect society as a 
whole (2012, 11). 
 In order to achieve this, the balance between ceding control of the day-to-day regulation 
of the Internet, while still protecting society, has been to take a unilateral approach (Sofaer, Clark 
and Whitfield 2010, 187). Cybersecurity has been delegated as a military matter and has earned 
its own department, the United States Cyber Command, or USCYBERCOM. This suggests that 
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the U.S. is treating cyberspace as a new military domain in which they could be a dominant actor, 
as they are in all other military spaces (Sofaer, Clark and Whitfield 2010, 192). While prior to 
2012, the United States government has been hesitant to discuss cybersecurity, there has been a 
change of heart in recent years. The White House launched an official policy initiative, and has 
been extensively funding enhanced security measures. While it is of course impossible to know 
exactly what cyber weapons and defenses they have in their arsenal, the fact they are discussing 
it means they want it to be known. Furthermore, the extremely advanced Stuxnet virus is attributed 
to the US and Israel, and offers insight into their potential capabilities.  
While the US has cooperated with its closest allies on matters of cybersecurity, and has 
some bilateral agreements with others, they have consistently opposed any calls for international 
treaties banning cyberwar (ibid.). In the past couple years, this mentality has been somewhat 
lessening, and the US has expressed some interest in pursuing an international solution, although 
nothing concrete has been promoted. 
 
4.6 Russian Cybersecurity 
While Russia is also a power player in the cyber arena, they had a very different experience 
regarding their acceptance of computers and the Internet. Russia is not typically thought of as a 
paragon of technology due to their legacy of relying on conventional weaponry during the Cold 
War. According to Nikolas K. Gvosder, this perception of Russia as being technologically 
backwards is because the “government was very suspicious of technologies that might break down 
the carefully constructed compartmentalization of information that existed in the country. There 
was no room in the Soviet system for breakthroughs such as those that produced the personal 
computer and the Internet in the United States” (2012, 174). In 1985 there were only fifty thousand 
personal computers in the Soviet Union, compared to over thirty million in the United States.  
 Regardless of their late entry into the field, they have been desperately and successfully 
playing catch-up. There are still major differences in the way Russia thinks about cyber threats 
compared to Western states. In Russian policy, cyber threats come under the umbrella of 
Information Warfare. They perceive content as being threatening, defining it as the “threat of the 
use of content for influence on the social-humanitarian sphere”. This is in opposition to the 
Western view that threats must be regulated while preserving the free flow of information. Russia 
supports a state-centric Internet governance scheme, whereby the state is in control of all activity 
     
 
37 
 
and infrastructure within its borders (Giles 2012, 2).  While the Russian government does have 
the ability to control and censor content, it tends to utilize that ability far less often than other 
states such as China, for instance (Giles 2012, 3).  
It is widely believed that Russia has been responsible for several offensive cyberattacks, 
namely those against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. However, Russia’s strategy is to enlist 
the services of civilian hackers in exchange for turning a blind eye to their other transgressions, 
so it has been very difficult to find definitive evidence of their participation (Giles 09/2012, 182). 
Despite the evidence (or speculation) that Russia has engaged in offensive cyberattacks just as 
the United States have, they have been the biggest advocate of a cyber arms control treaty.  
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5 ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Offense-Defense Theory Analysis 
By employing Offense-Defense Theory in an analysis of the United States’ behavior it 
becomes clear why they may not believe in a multilateral solution to the cyber issue. Furthermore, 
in order to reach a wholistic understanding of their behavior in the cybersecurity realm, and to 
hypothesize why they have not accepted or promoted a multilateral solution, it is important to 
know exactly what such a solution would entail, as well as the particular aspects of cyber threats 
which would make such a solution difficult to create and or maintain. These reasons are plentiful 
and must be accounted for when considering the behavior of the actors in this dilemma. By doing 
this we can explain why, even when it appears that the U.S. should desire something, they might 
not be pursuing it.  
 
5.1.1 The Cybersecurity Dilemma 
The first question one must ask in order to understand U.S. behavior is simply, ‘Would the 
United States benefit from a cyber arms control treaty?’ This question is difficult to definitively 
answer because the full extent of their cyber capabilities is unknown. However, from observable 
behaviors and circumstances, we can speculate on the answer to this question. 
There is evidence to the argument that the U.S. is disproportionately disadvantaged in the 
cyber arena. They are one of the most, if not the most ‘wired’ country; the economy and society 
are heavily networked. They might not have the most internet users, or the fastest internet speeds, 
but the U.S. uses networks to control electric power, pipelines, airlines, and railroads, to distribute 
consumer goods, for banking, and for contractor support of the military (Clarke and Knake 2014, 
398). Furthermore, these networks are operated by private companies which hold overwhelming 
political sway and are essentially able to control the political process in order to avoid most 
government regulation over operations (ibid.) Finally, the U.S. military is incredibly dependent 
on information systems, making it especially vulnerable (ibid.). Regardless of what cyber 
offensive capabilities the U.S. may or may not have, these circumstances mean that the U.S. would 
stand to benefit from a solution that would limit attacks against their networks. However, the 
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problem is much more nuanced than that, and there are many factors that must be taken into 
account when considering the viability of an international solution.  
The first problem to be considered when questioning a multilateral solution to an arms 
problem is known as the Offense-Defense balance. It is necessary to take this theory into 
consideration because it has been influential in determining the United States’ cyberpolicy. The 
main tenant of the theory, as discussed in an earlier chapter of this project, is that war is more 
likely when offense has the advantage (Jervis 1978). Offense has the advantage when the military 
is mobile and firepower is destructive. This theory has been modified to the cyber arena by Ilai 
Saltzman to say that offense has the advantage in cyberwar when cyberweapons are versatile, i.e 
have the ability to attack multiple ICT targets, and have excessive Byte power, i.e. can 
significantly damage an adversaries ICT infrastructure (Saltzman 2013, 43-44).  
Glaser and Kaufmann have determined that a measure of whether Offense or Defense has 
the advantage is the cost. If it costs more than one dollar to defend against every dollar spent on 
offensive capabilities, then Offense has the advantage (1998, 178). According to William J. Lynn, 
former Deputy Secretary of Defense, the US believes cyberwar to be asymmetric in favor of 
Offense because the low cost of computing devices means adversaries can pose significant threats 
to US military capabilities. As he elaborates: 
 
In cyberspace, the offense has the upper hand. The Internet was designed to be 
collaborative and rapidly expandable and to have low barriers to technological 
innovation; security and identity management were lower priorities. For these 
structural reasons, the U.S. government's ability to defend its networks always lags 
behind its adversaries' ability to exploit U.S. networks' weaknesses (2010). 
 
The belief in the Offense-Defense balance offers insight into why the United States might 
doubt the potential success of a multilateral treaty in limiting cyber warfare. Even if all parties 
unequivocally desired cyber arms control, which is not necessarily the case, the lack of trust 
between the parties could endanger its likelihood of success. The fact that the U.S. discourse on 
cyberpolicy has always stressed defense, while they have meanwhile been developing elaborate 
offensive capabilities reflects this adherence and consideration of the Offence-Defense balance.  
Although true cyberwar has yet to occur, the Offense-Defense balance predicts that it is 
likely to happen, because cyberwar favors the Offense. It is much easier to create and exploit an 
adversary than it is to predict and defend against an attack. Hackers are the main ‘weapons’ in 
cyberwar, and they are equally capable of offensive and defensive measures, and are therefor not 
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easily distinguishable. Furthermore, an attack has to succeed only once, whereas defense has to 
account for a plethora of possibilities. William J. Lynn describes the U.S. position succinctly with 
this statement:  
 
The cyber threat does not involve the existential implications ushered in by the 
nuclear age, but there are important similarities. Cyberattacks offer a means for 
potential adversaries to overcome overwhelming US advantages in conventional 
military power and to do so in ways that are instantaneous and exceedingly hard 
to trace (2010). 
 
The main takeaway from this is that the United States feels very vulnerable when it comes 
to cyberwar, and the likelihood that it is going to occur. As in other areas, the United States has 
always adhered to the policy that ‘The best defense is a good offense.’ When it comes to cyber 
weapons, it is impossible to know what you are defending against. If cyberwar favored the 
defensive capabilities, perhaps it would be easier to come to an agreement on cybersecurity at the 
multilateral level. This is not the case.  
Moreover, while the United States is the undeniable hegemon is the traditional arenas of 
power, it is disproportionately disadvantaged in the cyber arena. This is a field in which other 
states could benefit greatly by exploiting the defensive disadvantage of the field and attacking the 
United States. This brings about an interesting contradiction. Why, when the lesser powers stand 
to gain so much, have they, instead of attacking the United States, instead proposed a treaty to 
address cybersecurity? And why, when cyber threats and weapons have the potential to undermine 
the fundamental source of U.S. hegemony, are they opposed to a treaty that would ban their use? 
Especially when it appears that their adversaries are all too willing to use these weapons? 
 
5.1.2 Lack of Mutual Interest 
The answer to the question proposed above is complicated. Offense-Defense Theory 
explains how even when states have the same motivations, efforts at coming to an agreement can 
fail. However, when it comes to motivations and desired outcomes, the United States and Russia 
have very different ideas with regard to an ideal treaty on cyber arms. They have different 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as divergent views on what is the most dangerous type of cyber 
threat. This is evident when one examines the agreements that have thus far been promoted.  
Since 1998, Russia and its allies have been introducing draft resolutions on ‘Development 
in the field of information and telecommunication in the context of security’ and these have been 
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adopted, but they are generally no more than agreements to discuss potential threats and attempt 
to create norms regarding cybersecurity. The 2001 resolution called for a group of governmental 
experts to study potential threats and possible international cooperation regarding such threats. 
After several failed attempts at consensus, the group agreed on a report in 2009 (UNODA 2015). 
Two further reports were released in 2013 and 2015. These reports outline recommendations such 
as dialogue on norms for use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), 
confidence building and risk reduction measures, application of International Law to the cyber 
realm, elaboration of common terms and definitions on cybersecurity, etc (ibid.). But these were 
only recommendations for further action and were in no way binding agreements.  
The biggest effort at a treaty came in 2011. Russia, together with China, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan submitted a proposal for an international code of conduct for information security. 
This proposal called for a multilateral approach within the framework of the UN to establish 
international norms and settle disputes about cyberspace. The proposal was rejected for several 
reasons. One issue was language. By referring to ‘information and communication technologies’ 
as sources of threats, social media sites like Twitter and Facebook can be framed as weapons if 
their use violated individual state laws (Farnsworth 2011). The proposal says that states would 
not “use information and communication technologies, including networks, to carry out hostile 
activities or acts of aggression, pose threats to international peace and security, or proliferate 
weapons related technologies.” Russia and China view the free flow of information over social 
media sites as threatening to government stability (ibid.). Other issues that the US found with the 
proposal was that it omitted a clause holding states responsible for cyber criminals, patriotic 
hackers, and militias acting as agents of the state within their territories. Furthermore, it lacked 
language applying current laws of armed conflict to cyberspace (ibid.).  
Russia and China also sought to regulate cyberspace through the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), a UN organization responsible for coordinating telecoms use 
around the world. They suggested that the ITU should be responsible for coordinating 
international cybersecurity, data privacy, technical standards, and the global web address system. 
The US was strongly opposed to giving the ITU these responsibilities, as it would be forfeiting 
tasks over which they hold considerable influence into an organization in which all members have 
equal voting rights (Singer and Friedman 2014, 182).  
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There are fundamental differences between what these disparate states would hope to 
achieve with a cyber arms treaty. The United States and its allies emphasize the protection of 
computer networks from damage and theft, while Russia, China and allies are concerned with 
information security, mostly controlling content and communication (Segal, et. all 2011). They 
also disagree over “whether international laws of war and self-defense should apply to 
cyberattacks, the right to block information from citizens, and the roles that private or quasi 
private actors should play in internet governance” (ibid.). 
 More recently, there seems to be a shift in the attitude towards an arms control agreement 
from the U.S. perspective, if not from official avenues, then at least from the academic 
perspective. Joseph Nye, a leading academic and former policy advisor has recommended a cyber 
arms treaty in which states agree not to attack certain aspects of the civilian infrastructure of 
another country in peace time, to facilitate any countries’ requests for assistance after a malicious 
attack, and to build confidence by increasing the transparencies of their cyber policies (2015). He 
thinks this type of treaty could be achieved because it would be in state’s self interest not to start 
cyberwar for fear of retaliation. He also recommends that the U.S. could reveal what weapons 
they have, which are based on code vulnerabilities known as ‘zero days’, because this would 
simultaneously disarm themselves and their enemies (ibid.). Others offer a more pragmatic 
approach.  
 In his book entitled Cyberwar: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do 
About It, Richard A. Clarke, who worked under the Clinton administration and was partially 
responsible for rejecting the first Russian treaty proposal, offers much insight into the decision 
making process at the time: 
Despite some interest in the State Department in pursuing cyber arms control, and 
although the U.S. had to stand almost alone in the U.N. in rejecting cyber talks, we 
said no. I viewed the Russian proposal as largely a propaganda tool, as so many of 
their multilateral arms control initiatives had been for decades. Verification of any 
cyber agreement seemed impossible. Moreover, the U.S. had not yet explored what 
it wanted to do in the area of cyberwar. It was not obvious then whether or not 
cyberwar added to or subtracted from U.S. national security. So we said no, and 
we have kept saying no for over a decade now (2013, 387). 
 
Clarke goes on to describe that originally, they rejected the proposal because they doubted 
the sincerity of Russia, and also were hesitant to make any decisions when the field was so new 
and the U.S. policy was not fully developed (ibid.). However, that decision was made over a 
decade ago, and he has somewhat modified his position on how he thinks the U.S. should approach 
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the cybersecurity issue. With a background in arms control negotiation with Russia during the 
Cold War, he makes many comparisons to the arms talks during the nuclear age. 
 He suggests that the U.S. should continue to reject recent proposals because they include 
the ban of cyber espionage, which he says the U.S. is “really good at.” He also rejects any proposal 
that would ban the use of cyber weapons once a conflict has already started. This would put the 
United States in too difficult a position because they might be forced to choose between abiding 
by the terms of a treaty or using technology, which could limit potential damage and loss of life. 
Rather, the U.S. should seek a solution that bans the first use of cyberwar in peace time, limits the 
attack on civilian infrastructure, especially banks, and establishes modes of communication which 
would limit dangerous misunderstandings, as were present between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War. He also recommends a stipulation that the state in which any hacker resides 
be held responsible for the actions of those within its territories. This would limit the use of 
political ‘hacktivists’ and cybercriminals. His recommendations have not been actualized in any 
policy proposals from the United States. 
It is not without reason that the U.S. has not agreed to the Russian proposals, and why, if 
the U.S. were to propose the kind of treaty suggested by Clarke, it would likewise be dutifully 
rejected. Russia and China are more concerned with preventing information warfare and 
espionage, and the proposals they have presented recommended banning such acts, which the 
U.S. is arguably better at. While Russia and China have some degree of control over their 
Networks and Internet Service Providers, the real weakness of the U.S. is their reliance on private 
networks in areas of economy, military, and critical infrastructure. This has been demonstrated 
by the incredible number of attacks perpetrated against the US, especially in the civilian sector. 
The biggest and most damaging attacks thus far have been against private companies. The attacks 
suffered by Sony, Ebay and other companies have cost billions. The breach of the Office of 
Personnel Management at the White House exposed and endangered thousands of U.S. citizens. 
The U.S. has not yet been victim to any real acts of cyberwar, such as physical damage to 
infrastructure or military targets.  
 According to the idea of relative gain, states are not concerned with how much they can 
gain overall, but how much they gain in relation to each other. If these parties were to reach an 
agreement, they would all have to gain more than they would lose. In the case of the United States, 
agreeing to the Russian proposals would limit their use of cyber espionage, and could force them 
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to choose between abiding by the terms of the treaty and using technology that could mitigate 
damages in a conflict (Goldsmith 2011). Furthermore, in defining the types of weapons that would 
be limited, they would be giving up valuable information, and would have to trust that this would 
not be exploited (ibid.). If Russia or China were to agree to a treaty such as Clarke’s proposal, 
they would have to give up their use of political ‘hacktivists’ and the criminal activities such as 
theft of intellectual property. At this point in time it seems highly unlikely that either side would 
agree to the kind of sacrifices that would allow for the creation of a viable international solution. 
 
5.1.3 A Critical View of Multilateral Treaties for Cybersecurity 
Even if all states were to somehow come to an agreement, despite the Offense-Defense 
suggestion that this is unlikely, there are many factors that could still prevent a viable cyber arms 
treaty. Jack Goldsmith, a cyber law expert and former Whitehouse policy advisor, elaborates on 
this in his essay, in which he specifically responds to Clarke’s proposal. He argues that even if all 
nations stood to benefit from an international solution, there is no way to ensure cooperation, or 
even to agree on what cooperation means. If nations agreed not to engage in ‘hostile activity’, 
they would first have to agree on what ‘hostile’ means (2011, 6). Arms control treaties rely on 
precise definitions of weapons and their capabilities, but the nature of cybersecurity makes precise 
definitions of weapons, effects, and targets difficult. The nature of offensive cyber weapons is 
kept highly secret, because knowledge of the weapon allows for the creation of defenses. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish between targets (such as civilian/military) in cyberspace, 
especially since the military utilizes civilian networks, and therefore difficult to draw lines 
between what is and is not allowed (ibid.).  
He criticizes Clarke’s proposal and recent American rhetoric on cybersecurity for being 
demonstrative of false ideas of American Exeptionalism, because they assume that, rather than 
being part of the problem, the U.S. is largely a victim and that their cyber activities abroad are 
legitimate, while those actions of the United State’s adversaries are criminal. As he details: 
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The problem with those assumptions is that the United States is widely viewed as 
a major source of cyberattacks and exploitations, as well as a major spur to the 
cyber arms race. We have the biggest private botnets in the world. They are used 
for cyberattacks and exploitations around the globe, and the government has done 
practically nothing to clean them up. The government subsidizes a robust 
“hacktivist” community that uses digital tools for such activities as circumventing 
content filters in the networks of authoritarian states. It views these activities as 
benign, but the Chinese consider them on a par with the Google hack. In addition, 
the U.S. government has famously prodigious cyber exploitation and cyberattack 
capacities (ibid, 7). 
 
Goldsmith doubts that the United States would ever be willing to make the kind of 
concessions and self constraint that could actually facilitate negotiations of an international arms 
control treaty because what the U.S. needs to do in order to protect itself is in deep conflict with 
their commitments to limited government and private control of the communications 
infrastructure (ibid.). American political rhetoric has long depicted the U.S. as the ‘shining city 
on the hill’ to which all other nations of the world should admire and aspire to. In order to achieve 
real gains in cybersecurity through agreements with authoritarian states such as Russia and China, 
the U.S. would have to sacrifice this self image and either admit that they are just as guilty as 
other states, or else abandon the long held belief that it is the United States’ moral responsibility 
to spread American ideals of democracy and freedom to the world’s downtrodden.  
If all these issues were somehow to be resolved, the biggest problem still remains. Any 
international treaty depends on the adherence of individual states; despite the best hopes of some 
progressivists, a world society does not exist and international law is still a loose relation of states 
aimed at achieving order, rather than justice (Armstrong 1999, 547). Viability of international 
order “depends on states’ choices to comply with rather than violate international law, and to 
pursue the negotiated common position rather than the individualistic, short-term self-interested 
one” (Hurd 2014, 44). In the absence of a global government, states seek a way to verify adherence 
to international agreements.  
This verification is especially difficult in the area of cybersecurity, because attribution is 
difficult. Law, even international law, depends upon the burden of proof. Proving who was 
responsible for cyber incidents is difficult. Hackers are able to reroute through other countries, 
and even if the original source can be found, it is difficult to prove whether it came from a 
government or a civilian. Even if there were perfect attribution, giving evidence of guilt often 
means the methods with which it was found must be revealed, making those methods less useful 
(Goldsmith 2011, 11). As discussed earlier, there is also an advantage to striking first and no 
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possibility to predict a breach of the treaty before it happens. As opposed to conventional 
weapons, it could take days, weeks, months, or even years to realize that the terms of a treaty had 
been violated.  
 Additionally, the treaty could only really apply to the actions of the state. The vast majority 
of cyberattacks are perpetrated by individual actors, and persecuting these actors would depend 
on a state’s willingness to either give up its own citizens to the justice of another country, or trust 
that individuals would be punished by their own governments to a satisfactory degree. Examples 
of Russia and China’s use of patriotic hackers are plentiful, with Russia utilizing them in the 
attacks on Estonia, and the Chinese government encouraging the theft of intellectual property 
from western companies. The U.S. has also indirectly encouraged political ‘hacktivists’ who have 
thwarted the control of autocratic governments in their pursuit of spreading political freedom 
(Goldsmith 2011). While this doesn’t seem like a crime from the American standpoint, it very 
much does when viewed from the other perspective. To abide by any treaty, the state would have 
to take responsibility for the actions of all its own citizens.  
Moreover, even if violations of the treaty were possible to detect, the classic means by 
which International Law is enforced and/or punished, are difficult to manage. In the absence of 
an international regulatory body capable of monitoring international law, states traditionally 
undertake methods of reciprocity, collective action, and community policing or shaming (Kahan 
2002). These tactics are not well suited to regulation of cybersecurity. Because of the first-strike 
advantage and the time delay in realizing one has been attacked, reciprocity is difficult and will 
not necessarily inflict equal damage. As mentioned, revealing evidence of who committed an 
attack potentially ruins further use of the methods by which the evidence was collected, 
minimizing the use of public shaming.  
 
5.1.4 Implications for further Analysis 
 The intent of the previous section is to explain the difficulties inherent in the creation of 
an arms treaty insofar as it may have influenced the behavior of relevant actors. The significance 
of this is twofold and contradictory. American cyberpolicy, with its adherence to the Offense-
Defense theory, proves hesitant to pursue a multilateral solution, even in the case of mutual 
interest. This is not to say that there is mutual interest at this time; the priorities of the nations 
vary significantly. While the United States is disproportionately affected by cybercrimes such as 
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the theft of intellectual property, and their heavy reliance on private networks for regulation of 
critical infrastructure makes them vulnerable, they are advantaged in other ways. Although exact 
details are necessarily kept confidential, it is widely believed that the United States has extensive 
cyber espionage capabilities as well as highly advanced offensive weapons. Not to mention that 
they benefit from the open nature of the Internet in the dissemination of American ideals and 
influence. Russia and China have also demonstrated advanced cyber capabilities, and perhaps 
even more willingness to use these resources. They benefit from a measure of control over their 
own Networks, which allows them an advantage with regard to defensive measures.  
While the difficulties inherent in an international solution contribute to an explanation as 
to why the United States has distanced itself from such an agreement, it makes the Russian 
preference more of a mystery. Why, despite the overwhelming odds facing a successful cyber 
treaty have they continued to pursue such an agreement? Why would they want a treaty banning 
cyber weapons when they have demonstrated a willingness to use them, and have evidently 
greatly benefitted from the use of cybercrime to steal intellectual property from their adversaries?  
According to Richard Clarke: 
A simple test of whether an area is ripe for arms control is to determine if all parties 
have a real interest in limiting their own investments in the area. If a party is 
proposing to stop something that they really want to keep around, then they are 
likely merely engaged in arms control for propaganda or as a deceptive means of 
constraining a potential opponent in an area where they think they may be 
outclassed (2014, 396). 
 
 By this simple “test” it becomes evident that there might be ulterior motives involved in 
Sino-Russian cooperation in this area, and explanations must be sought through less obvious 
channels. The Offense-Defense literature explains how it is possible to avoid war in the case of 
mutual interest, but upon deeper inspection of the treaties proposed by Russia and China, it does 
not appear that there is mutual interest. Offense-Defense theory predicts that cyberwar is likely, 
and the security dilemma will be severe. The treaties proposed by Russia and supported by China 
do not contradict this, because they seek to constrain the hegemonic U.S. while still allowing them 
to benefit from their own cyber capabilities. Further explanations must be sought to explain why 
Russia and China have promoted multilateral treaties to the cybersecurity dilemma.   
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5.2 The Soft Balancing motivations 
In this section, soft balancing theory will be presented as a further explanation of the 
behavior of the U.S. and Russia concerning their positions on the cybersecurity issue. This section 
will demonstrate how Russia and its allies are using soft balancing strategies against the U.S., 
which explains why the U.S. might reject any proposals as they interpret them as a threat to their 
status. As explained in the previous section, while the U.S. might have many reasons to desire an 
international solution to the cybersecurity dilemma, they have many reasons to doubt the 
intentions of Russia and its allies.  
First an analysis will be given related to the reasons countries tend to balance against the 
U.S. The first reason is related to the international perception of U.S. aggressiveness. - using its 
status as a great power – which creates the necessity for weaker countries to react against the 
hegemonic power as an attempt to keep the balance in the international system.  In this vein the 
Stuxnet case will be discussed as an example of American aggressiveness in the field of 
cybersecurity. Following this discussion is an analysis that delves deeper than mere U.S. 
aggressiveness as the cause of  other states balancing against the U.S.  
In addition, the mechanisms Russia and China are utilizing in an attempt to balance the 
U.S. power will be explored; namely how they are making use of the soft balancing 
strategies/steps stated by Pape (2005). In this case, Russia is employing: ‘entangling diplomacy’, 
addressing the problem in the level of international institutions (applied specifically to the UN); 
‘regional arrangement’ with China and other countries geographically close to them; and also, 
‘signals of resolve to balance’, Once Russia was alone in 1998 addressing the subject in the UN 
and persuaded other states to act in conjunction with them concerning addressing cybersecurity 
at a UN multilateral level. 
 
5.2.1 Reasons to make use of Soft Balancing strategies 
One of the reasons countries tend to balance against the hegemonic country, is if the 
hegemonic country behaves aggresively. Thus, when the U.S. acts in an aggressive position, 
second-tier countries tend to respond with a soft balancing strategy against it, as stated by Pape 
(2005). A classic example of the American aggressive position can be seen in the foreign policy 
of the country during the Bush administration (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Ferdinand 2007). With 
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regards to the cyber sphere, there are two ways in which Russia and its allies may have perceived 
the U.S. to be acting aggressively with regard to cybersecurity. The first is with regard to its 
perceived ‘control’ of the Internet, the second is the ways in which the U.S. has asserted its cyber 
capabilities.  
As discussed in the Background section of this project, the U.S. has unilaterally kept the 
Internet free from sovereign governments. While the U.S. and many western countries think this 
is desirable, the regime stability of Russia and likeminded autocratic regimes depends upon 
control over information. Russia and its allies do not have the power to directly oppose the United 
States in achieving their goals. The traditional power superiority of the U.S. is so great that they 
cannot even make use of traditional means of ‘balancing’ against a superpower such as military 
alliances. Rather, they have the option of ‘soft’ forms of balancing against the U.S. While keeping 
the Internet free from governance does not appear to be ‘aggressive’ from the U.S. perspective, 
from the view of their adversaries it is a direct and compromising policy. The regimes stability 
depends upon their control over information. This provides a motivation for Russia to create a 
treaty which would assert sovereign control over the Internet.  
  Another way in which American actions could be perceived as aggressive, which started 
in the Bush era and gained force during Obama’s administration, is the STUXNET case. “Obama 
decided to accelerate the attacks — begun in the Bush administration and code-named Olympic 
Games — even after an element of the program accidentally became public in the summer of 
2010 because of a programming error that allowed it to escape Iran’s Natanz plant and sent it 
around the world on the Internet. Computer security experts who began studying the worm, which 
had been developed by the United States and Israel, gave it a name: Stuxnet” (Sanger 2012). 
According to Schneier, “Stuxnet is an Internet worm that infects Windows computers. It 
primarily spreads via USB sticks, which allows it to get into computers and networks not normally 
connected to the Internet. Once inside a network, it uses a variety of mechanisms to propagate to 
other machines within that network and gain privilege once it has infected those machines.” 
(Schneier 2010). But the main point is that the Internet worm does not do anything in infected 
Windows computers; infecting Windows computers is just a bridge to achieve the main goal of 
the worm. It “looks for is a particular model of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) made by 
Siemens […]. These are small embedded industrial control systems that run all sorts of automated 
processes: on factory floors, in chemical plants, in oil refineries, at pipelines–and, yes, in nuclear 
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power plants” (Schneier 2010). The main point of Stuxnet is that the worm does not act like “a 
criminal worm […]. Stuxnet performs sabotage” (Schneier 2010). To have an idea of the damages 
of Stuxnet, Sanger (2012) states that “the last of that series of attacks, a few weeks after Stuxnet 
was detected around the world, temporarily took out nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Iran 
had spinning at the time to purify uranium”. As one can see, the main goal of the attack was over 
the boundaries of cyberspace: it was a way to contain Iran’s nuclear weapon production.  
The U.S. aggressiveness is a motivation, which increases the attempts of states to act 
against the country (Pape 2005; Paul 2005). The position of the U.S. causes a reaction in the 
international system, once other countries can see the U.S. as a threat to the stability of the 
international order, as well, a danger to their own foreign policies limiting their space of action. 
Many are the field of the “aggressive acts” made by the U.S. and many are the impacted areas in 
the rest of the world. However, related to cybersecurity – which is the focus of this project – the 
Stuxnet case can be seen as a good example of the American aggressiveness and motivations for 
countries balancing against the super-power specifically in this measure 
As stated by Pape and Paul, the U.S. aggressiveness is one of the reasons that increased 
the Sino-Russian cooperation in the pacific (2005; 2005). According to Bergfeldt “other scholars 
have expressed the same view [as the authors]. Feng Shaolie argues that both U.S.-Russia and 
Sino-U.S. relations improved radically after 9/11 […]. However, he argues – a series of events – 
most notably the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the following attempts to dominate the Middle 
East, the color revolutions in the CIS states, the fact that the U.S. is still in Central Asia, and 
NATO’s eastwards expansion, have enhanced Sino-Russian strategic relations” (2008, 16). 
According to Li, “intense examination of the developing trajectory of Russia-China relations 
reveals that it is external, rather than internal factors that constitute the primary dynamics to the 
deepening rapprochement between Russia and China” (2007, 497).  
However, although perceptions of aggression from the Superpower increase the chances 
that states will act to balance against it, they are not a vital factor. States can choose to balance 
against the superpower for a variety of other reasons. For instance, countries may choose to 
balance because they want to improve their position among the other second-tier states in the 
international system, and cybersecurity is a good field to explore, because it has no multilateral 
agreement related to this subject and countries are free to articulate other solutions among 
themselves.       
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Following, the mechanisms Russia – in some cases, in conjunction with China – is utilizing 
to balance against the U.S. in the cybersecurity measure will be presented. This project is taking 
into account these mechanisms stated by Pape (2005), explained previously in the Theory section 
and applied in the context of the cybersecurity. However, other mechanisms – and their fields of 
application - defended by other authors, which will not be touched in this project considering the 
theoretical frame presented in the Theory section. In addition, the project is focused on 
cybersecurity, so, the soft balancing measure is applied in this context. Notwithstanding, there are 
many other fields where countries need to balance. So, cybersecurity is one of the many domains 
where soft balancing happens. 
 
5.2.2 Mechanisms of Soft Balancing 
As defined by Pape (2005), there are specific tools/mechanisms second-tier states can use 
to balance the power against the superior state. In the particular case of cybersecurity, the 
mechanisms explored will be limited to three: territorial denial, in the sense that weaker countries 
tend to approximate geographically to other countries from the same region; entangling 
diplomacy, where Russia – and in some moments China – is making use of the institutions, as the 
United Nations to balance the power against the United States; and, the signals of resolving to 
balance mechanism, taking the case that Russia is advocating in the UN an international 
agreement since 1998 and, over time, is getting the support of other states in the sense of 
cooperation.  
5.2.2.1 Territorial Denial 
The first way in which soft balancing is pursued is only indirectly related to the 
cybersecurity case, one “hard” factor related to the territorial issue in the Pacific countries. 
According to Pape, “superior states often benefit from access to the territory of third parties as 
staging areas for ground forces or as transit for air and naval forces” (2005, 36).  
 In 2005, Uzbekistan was strongly criticized by the U.S. government, which claimed the 
countries’ actions related to a brutal crackdown “on opposition groups in Uzbekistan in 2005” 
(Bergfeldt 2008, 13), were an attack on the human rights and called for an international 
investigation. This situation made Uzbekistan rethink the presence of the U.S. troops in their 
territory. The country leadership decided that “aligning with China and Russia would be less of a 
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threat (ibid, 14), than to keep the approximation with the U.S.. In March of the same year, during 
the Tulip-revolution in another territory, Kyrgyzstan, the leadership also called for a renegotiation 
of the presence of American bases in the region (ibid; Cooley 2007, 67).  
Taking this situation as the framework, in the following year, the draft proposed for an 
international resolution in cybersecurity at the UN “is no longer sponsored by the Russia 
Federation alone” (Maurer 2011,  22). Within the countries now pursuing the resolution, can be 
found – among others from the Pacific region – Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as the co-sponsors 
of the draft (ibid). There is no causal link between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s support of the 
cybersecurity proposal as being directly related to their dissatisfaction with the United States. 
However, it aligns with the predictions of Soft Power theory that states who are unable to directly 
oppose a superpower will make use of soft forms and align with other countries in the region to 
subtly oppose the super power. 
There is another hypothetical way in which these countries could pursue territorial denial, 
if they were to achieve their ideal cybersecurity treaty, which offers a potential motivation. As the 
Internet is now, it is open and borderless. However, Russia and its allies have striven to create a 
‘bordered’ Internet that could be governed by the individual nation states. If they were successful 
in this goal, they could potentially “deny territory” in cyberspace by refusing to all the U.S. and 
its companies, ideas, etc. into the Russian cyberspace. This would offer a further platform by 
which Russia and its allies could balance against the U.S. 
 
5.2.2.2 Entangling Diplomacy 
“Cyber warfare is no longer a science fiction and the debate among policy-makers on what 
norms will guide behavior in cyberspace is in full swing. The United Nations is one of the forums 
where this debate is taking place” (Maurer 2011, 3). In addition, “the activity at the UN over the 
course of the past decade exhibits an astonishing rate of norm emergence in cyberspace relative 
to typical international relations timelines” (ibid). In 2011, Russia, in conjunction with China, 
were the heads of an International code of conduct for information security proposal. “In 2010, 
the U.S. reversed its long-standing policy position by co-sponsoring for the first time a draft 
resolution” on this topic (ibid). Controversially as one could expect, “The issue of information 
security has been on the UN agenda since the Russian Federation in 1998 first introduced a draft 
resolution in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly” (UNODA 2015).  
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According to Pape, “Even strong states do not have complete freedom to ignore either the 
rules and procedures of important international organizations or accepted diplomatic practices 
without losing substantial support for their objectives” (2005, 36). So, pursuing the discussion at 
the level of the UN can be seen as a strategy of the Russian effort to balance against the United 
States. Bringing back again Ferdinand’s ideas “as far the impact of the U.S., there is no doubt that 
the repeated calls for multipolarity are a reaction against perceived American unipolarity” (2007,  
862).  
Moreover, this strategy is effective, “especially if the superior state is also a democracy” 
(Pape 2005, 36). In this sense, while Russia was alone pursuing a draft resolution “in the field of 
information and telecommunications in the context of international security” (UNODA 2015), the 
country was not a “strong voice” being by itself. However, once Russia gained power and the 
support of other states, the country increased its power of balancing against the U.S.. The country, 
which was against the Resolution, finally voted in favor of it in 2008. The importance of the 
cooperation among the second-tier countries, which aim to balancing against the super power, 
will be explained in the following section. 
  
5.2.2.3 Signals of Resolve to Balancing 
“Second-ranked powers seeking to act collectively against a sole superpower confront 
intense concern that the needed collective action will not materialize” (Pape 2005, 37).  
Taking into consideration this assumption, “The Russian government first introduced a 
draft resolution on ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the 
context of security’ in the First Committee in 1998 and every year since then” (Maurer 2011, 20). 
As stated by Maurer (2001), it is possible to divide into three the phases of the trajectory of 
cybersecurity measure in the level of the UN, headed initially by Russia in 1998: 
 
Phase 1: 1998-2004- First Steps Towards Cyber Norms: the draft resolution proposed by 
Russia in 1998, became a Resolution on 4 January 1999. During this period Russia was working 
towards trying to bring its Resolution proposal into vote. The country was by itself pursuing this 
topic. 
Phase 2: 2005 – 2008 – Stepping Backward, Signs of a Dynamic Process: At this period, 
“in 2005, an important change took place in the First Committee. The draft resolution introduced 
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by Russia is adopted but goes to a recorded vote for the first time in the history. The U.S. is the 
only country voting against the Resolution” (ibid, 22). The country kept voting against in the 
following years until 2008 (ibid, 21). However, Russia gained more allies in the goal of pursing 
the topic to a multilateral level. Now the country was not alone anymore but followed by: China, 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
In this same period,  the first report of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), 
established in 2004, was presented. According to UNODA, “there have been four Groups of 
Governmental Experts (GGEs) that have examined the existing and potential threats from the 
cyber sphere and possible cooperative measures to address them” (2015). 
 
Phase 3: 2009-2011 – Forward Again: the GGE came into a consensus and stated that 
“existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security are among the most serious 
challenges of the twenty-fist century (Maurer 2011, 23). At this period, “when the major 
WikiLeaks releases and Stuxnet are taking place, the U.S., for the first time, decides to co-sponsor 
the Russian draft resolution in the First Committee. […] Unlike during the first phase, however, 
the resolution is now not only sponsored by Russia but also co-sponsered by three dozen countries 
including the People’s Republic of China” (ibid; and UN General Assembly A/65/405). 
 
During these phases, the most important point to notice is that Russia was, at the first 
moment – and during an extensive period – by itself addressing this topic to the UN General 
Assembly. However, in 2006 the draft resolution was not presented by Russia alone, now there 
were other countries with Russia, pursuing a multilateral solution. Firstly, countries from the same 
region co-sponsored the draft; lately, countries from other regions also followed Russia. 
Moreover, even having failed in arriving to a consensus on the cybersecurity measure, the first 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established in 2004 consisted of 15 governmental experts 
from 15 regions of the world instead of the “Pacific-zone”, such as: Belarus, Brazil, China, France, 
Germany, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Russia Federation, 
South Africa, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States 
of America” (Maurer 2001, 22). The first group had met three times and “unanimously elected 
Andrey V. Krustskikh of the Russia Federation as the Chairman” (ibid, 22). Over the years, the 
four GGEs were formed by several and most diverse UN member countries. So finally, Russia 
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could bring into discussion several nations thought the GGEs and, more than this, in 1998 being 
alone, Russia could gather more than 30 countries as co-sponsors of its proposed resolution. 
Soft balancing needs cooperation against the super-power to succeed. “If multiple states 
can cooperate, repeatedly [..] they may gradually increase their trust in each other’s willingness 
to cooperate against the unipolar leader’s ambitions […] Accordingly, the measure of success for 
soft balancing is not limited to whether the sole superpower abandons specific policies, but also 
includes whether more states join a soft-balancing coalition against the unipolar leader” (Pape 
2005, 37).   
5.2.3 Beyond Soft Balancing 
Soft Balancing is a rich framework in the attempt to explain the behavior of the United 
Stated and the Sino-Russia cooperation in the measure of cybersecurity. However, it cannot be 
seen as a single and isolated explanation. Instead of soft balancing, for instance, one of the reasons 
to justify the behavior of the U.S. and Russia, it is that they have diverse interests related to their 
cyberspace strategies so they, consequently, act differently to achieve their goals. Cybersecurity 
is a current topic and it is hard to point out definitive answers to the behavior of the countries 
considering this topic. Because of that, this project presents further frames trying to find the 
answer to the proposed problem as the one seen in the previous chapter and, the one, which will 
be presented in the following section related to the Soft Power theory. 
 
5.3 The Soft Power motivations  
“The United States may be more powerful than any other polity since the Roman Empire, 
but like Rome, America is neither invincible nor vulnerable. Rome did not succumb to the rise of 
another empire, but to the onslaught of waves of barbarians.” (NYE 2004, X). 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of new international actors the 
hegemonic leadership of the U.S. has been somewhat reduced. Many countries around the world 
have started to experience new political paths and economic growth, and the world order 
promoted for several decades by the U.S. has also facilitated a large array of regional and 
international transformations. But in the new world order the presence of new players also means 
new challenges and a competitive fight for the global leadership. “With the global shifts in power 
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and influence, it is clear that more states are seeking voice and authority in the operation of the 
system” (Ikenberry 2015, 452). Despite these changes, so far no other state or coalition of states 
has been able to overcome and transgress the American global leadership, but it’s also true that 
the world order is inexorably changing, with some scholars believing it is on the path toward a 
new sort of global governance (ibid.).  
In this context, the U.S. appears to be more keen and involved in the use of soft power 
strategy and has strong motivations to retain its power of persuasion over other states and non-
state actors. This tactic fits in the new global arena represented by cyberspace, where all the 
national and non-national entities are called to the challenge of establishing their power.   
 
5.3.1 The American motivations 
In the last decades the United States seems to be more interested and involved in dealing 
with cyberspace and cybersecurity issue using a soft power approach rather than hard power. As 
it’s revealed by the AFCEA9 association, since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, which 
began after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the U.S. has been more and more committed to the use 
of sophisticated cyber tools. The practice of these methods aimed to solve the problems has also 
shown how the use of soft power has increased the American influence and the advantages 
especially in the long term (AFCEA report). Nowadays no countries have the power to directly 
impose their will beyond their national borders without the use of hard powers, and using hard 
power risks triggering a direct conflict; this is one of the reasons that is fomenting the debate 
about the expansion or protection of the states in cyberspace (Bejarano 2013). According to Maria 
Caro Bejarano, the U.S. is adopting an expansionistic strategy in cyberspace in order to promote 
and secure two central factors: on the one hand the national economy and the business power’s 
growth; on the other hand a proper and robust protection against any threat from the “outside”. 
Following the author’s statements, since the creation of the Internet, the American government 
has shown a keen interest in the control and securitization of cyberspace using soft power 
techniques.  
                                                          
9 AFCEA - member-based, non-profit association for professionals that provides highly sought after thought 
leadership, engagement and networking opportunities. Focused on cyber, command, control, communications, 
computers and intelligence to address national and international security challenges. AFCEA provides a forum for 
military, government and industry communities to collaborate so that technology and strategy align with the needs of 
those who serve. More information available at < http://www.afcea.org/site/ >. 
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As Joseph Nye stated: "Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values 
like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive." (Nye 2004, X). 
It’s not a case then, that the U.S. is currently avoiding the use of hard power and is not pursuing 
any international agreement on this question; on the one side it’s quite evident to see that for the 
U.S. government is more convenient to use a “seductive” strategy and try to maintain this 
situation. On the other hand, the traditional soft power promoted by the U.S. may not evoke the 
same consensus that have been gathered in the past years, mainly because of the rise of new 
international actors and the difficulty to keep an hegemonic role (Clark 2011, 21). 
The soft power used by the U.S. can be compared to two other concepts: the fleet in being 
and the Mahan’s naval strategy. The first concept is related to the naval wars and it has been 
coined in the XVII century by the captain of the Royal British Navy, Arthur Herbert. The concept 
was based on the idea that a fleet during a conflict may not be directly involved in the clashes 
against the enemy, but it can indirectly influence the war events, representing a constant and 
potential threat for the rival. Therefore the theory of the fleet in being is similar for many things 
to the present soft power behaviors adopted by the U.S. in the cybersecurity arena. This concept 
is contrasted by the doctrine of the command of the sea, which expects the involvement of the 
naval forces in order to defeat the enemy and keep the control (Mauriella 2009, 17-18). This last 
concept is in many ways more similar to the present hard power's strategy and it can be represented 
to the behaviors adopted by the Russian and Chinese governments. 
The concept of the Mahan’s naval strategy has also old origins, but it can be applied 
nowadays to the management of cyberspace as promoted by the U.S. government. This concept 
is based on the idea that cyberspace can be both expanded and protected at the same time, exactly 
like the navy before or during a conflict (Bejarano 2013, 2). Therefore it is clear that the 
application of hard power in cyberspace by the U.S. is neither easy nor convenient; maintaining 
an unregulated cyberspace and a high level of cybersecurity is giving to the U.S. the opportunity 
to increase their influence and control over other commercial entities and political rivals. In this 
sense the U.S. is benefitting from control over the Internet and it is very committed to keep it open 
and free because it represents a major tool to maintain and enhance its soft power. This power is 
exercised in many ways but the common elements which create a general sense of involvement 
are still the credibility, the persuasion and the seduction that U.S. is able to employ on the other 
actors. Hence this process lead also other countries (especially in the Western world) to be aligned 
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to the American position and to foster non-intervention actions in cyberspace (Nye 2002). 
Nonetheless there are countries such as Russia and China who are pushing to reform this question 
and bring the issue in front of an international committee.  
 
5.3.2 The Sino-Russian motivations 
The present situation is representative of a world divided in two halves: on one side there 
is the American way, which seeks to control and manage cyberspace and its cybersecurity; on the 
other side, there are countries like Russia and China who want to proceed in a more direct and 
sharp way. In fact it’s not new that both countries have already attempted many times and in 
different ways to find an international agreement on this issue. In 1998 for the first time the 
Russian Federation called for a resolution in the field of information and telecommunications in 
the context of international security at the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN General 
Assembly 1999). That was the turning point for countries like Russia, China and other “allied” 
states to argue that cyberspace has to be reformulated in a different way, which has to diverge 
from the American model. The Russian government affirms that cyberspace and the cybersecurity 
system is built on a Western framework which is inherently different from their position and it’s 
high time to manage this international question in another way (Giles 2012). Indeed now it is 
evident that countries like Russia and China feel a deep dissatisfaction on the management of 
cyberspace and cybersecurity; according to Bejarano:  
 
Not that long ago, all Internet traffic passed through the U.S. infrastructure. From 
a security point of view, this situation is shifting quite rapidly due to the lower cost 
of information technologies and the increasing concern for the protection of 
electronic communications. In consequence, other nations create their own 
communications backbones to prevent their Internet traffic from going through the 
U.S. infrastructure (Bejarano 2013, 4). 
 
The author insists that the American government is currently trying to centralize the 
processing and online storage, in order to hold more information and allow them to exercise more 
influence. Hence this ongoing situation is leading to worsen the international collaboration on this 
matter. A new call has been addressed at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2015 and 
this time the signatory states were not only Russia and China but also other countries such as 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This gesture showed how the cyberspace 
issue has taken a serious turn and the attempt has been once again to rethink the norms that 
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regulate cyberspace and cybersecurity and “formulate relevant international norms, in order to 
address common challenges in the sphere of information security” (UN General Assembly 2015). 
One of the key points of divergence between the Sino-Russian and the Western (or 
American) approach to the cyberspace issue is the use and the control of information. If on the 
one side cyberspace is considered as a “free world” where everyone has the freedom to express 
themselves and to get information, on the other side cyberspace is a threat to the national security 
and it’s absolutely necessary to set a series of norms and laws to regulate a sophisticated and 
delineated cybersecurity. This circumstance leads to think that beside the protection of the 
freedom of expression and the free flows of information, the U.S. and other Western countries are 
getting benefits from the control of cyberspace. In fact authors like Keir Giles affirms that “the 
USA is currently the only country possessing information superiority and the ability significantly 
to manipulate this space” (Giles 2012, 65). 
 Despite this it’s not officially forbidden for the other countries to launch soft power 
campaigns and undertake new foreign policies by themselves, trying to achieve a certain level of 
influence on the other political and economic decision-makers; but the success in doing this 
depends on the ability to persuade and convince the other entities. The U.S. still has the most 
effective soft power resources, and the open nature of the Internet is one of the main vehicles by 
which this power is disseminated. Consequently those countries which have more skills and power 
to mobilize the networks through a soft power behavior will be the ones who drive and shape the 
global affairs (McClory 2015, 15-16). By this logic, it makes perfect sense that Russia and China 
would want to assert more control and borders on the Internet in order to limit the spread of this 
power. However in the last years some of the world’s major powers have demonstrated a desperate 
need to find a clear conduct code on cybersecurity and again, two coalitions seem to be deployed 
in contrast.  
In the statements of the Russian government, the key point of the disagreements are based 
not only on the communication and cybersecurity issues but also on “Internet sovereignty” itself. 
In the Kremlin intentions there is the goal to create a set of laws to establish the limits and the 
borders of the Internet, within and between the states. This is perhaps the reason that explains the 
long series of attempts to find an international agreement on this question, even calling for a U.N. 
resolution. Farther in the East, the Chinese government through the use of a more hard power 
strategy within its national borders, has already introduced a network security regulation in 1994 
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(as known as the Golden Shield Project) and since then the regulation and the control of the 
Internet has been increasingly modified in a more sophisticated and meticulous way (Lewis 2006). 
The major concern of Russia and China is that the free flows of information could destabilize 
their central governments and this is the main reason to push U.S. and the international community 
for a “bordered” Internet, that they can control and filter. In a statement of the SCN10: 
 
the PRC has shown that they view free access to the internet to be an essential 
threat [and] have also signaled their concern about management and control of 
internet through their sponsorship, along with Russia […] of a UN General 
Assembly resolution that would establish an “international code of conduct” 
creating “norms and rules guiding the behavior” of countries (SCN 2012, 2). 
 
From the Sino-Russian point of view the rules that control cyberspace have to be written 
in a specific way, which suit their expectations. Because of this, even a recent initiative drawn-up 
by the Council of Europe has been rejected by Russia; this was the Convention on Cybercrime, 
also known as the Budapest Convention, held in 2001. The aim of the meeting was to seek an 
international agreement on the Internet and computer crime. Additionally the goals of the 
initiative were to harmonize the national laws, improve the investigative techniques and increase 
the international cooperation on the cyberspace field. In spite of this diplomatic and soft power 
impulse, the Russian government decided to neither sign nor ratify the treaty because from its 
point of view it’s intolerable to lose the principle of sovereignty to the advantage of a foreign 
country (Giles 2012, 67). On the other side the American government signed the Treaty already 
in 2001, ratified the document in 2006 and entered into force in 2007. As reported in the treaty of 
the Convention:  
A Party may, without the authorization of another Party [...] access or receive, 
through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another 
Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has 
the lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party through that computer system. 
(Convention on Cybercrime 2001). 
 
Looking at this statement it is evident how both Russia and China are bothered by the 
present world order and are keen to shake up the cyberspace mainly dominated by the United 
States. Their wish is to create a new cyberspace based on the concept of bilateral agreements 
between the states. In fact both the Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Chinese president 
                                                          
10 SCN (Security Capabilities Network) is part of the National Strategy Information Center and it’s a nonprofit 
educational organization which undertakes innovative research and educational programs to enhance security in the 
U.S. More information available at < http://www.strategycenter.org/ >. 
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Xi Jinping, have already signed dozens of bilateral agreements concerning different topics. But it 
was during the 70th Anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat in the Second World War held in 
Moscow in May 2015, that the Kremlin and the Beijing leaders signed the last agreement on the 
Internet field. It is the first bilateral non-hacking pact and it seems mainly devoted to undermine 
the American control on the cyberspace (Risen, 2015). This is a clear pro-active response of the 
two Eastern countries to advocate for direct control of the Internet and to create a parallel structure 
to the American one. Furthermore this action can lead to the risk of a consequent exacerbation of 
the issue and trigger a hard power response from both parties. This agreements hints to read 
between the lines and find out that beside the bilateral agreements between Russia and China, 
both countries will continue to put pressure on the U.N. and move beyond the present situation in 
the field of Internet security and telecommunication networks.  
 
5.3.3 Moving beyond 
“Even when we focus primarily on particular agents or actors, we cannot say that an 
actor “has power” without specifying power “to do what.” One must specify who is involved in 
the power relationship (the scope of power) as well as what topics are involved (the domain of 
power.) Cyberspace is a new and important domain of power.” (Nye 2010, 2). 
 
The formation of new alliances and the maintenance of the old ones can determine different 
outcomes in the international relations and global system. In today’s world many battles are not 
fought on a real battlefield and the ability to attract new allies which can support and promote a 
certain “way of thinking” and “way of doing” become deeply significant. These considerations 
are maybe even more important nowadays compared with the past decades, especially because 
the new international system has changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of 
new and influential actors, such as the Russian Federation, the Chinese Democratic Republic and 
so forth. (Walt 2008). The domain of power is then challenged and competed in different places 
and cyberspace has definitely become a major one. According to Joseph Nye the extension of 
power in cyberspace has not solved the “problem” of the geographical space and it won’t eliminate 
the states sovereignty, however it has surely brought more confusion and complication in the 
context of the division and exercise of power (Nye 2010). As already stated above, nowadays the 
world seems divided in two different blocks with divergent purposes and once again in the history 
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the two parties are divided in two specific areas, but conversely to some decades ago, today the 
frictions are in most cases faced in cyberspace. In the words of a document delivered by CACI 
Inc.11, it became particularly evident after the 9/11 terrorist attacks that new actors were 
threatening the security of the American governments especially hacking the national cyberspace; 
because of this it has been noted that the best way to tackle this problem was to use the so-called 
smart power, which consisted in a balanced synthesis of hard and soft power (CACI Inc. 2009). 
From that moment, a consensus has emerged among the various sectors of the society with the 
scope to collaborate together on the defense of the country using an advanced soft power strategy. 
The enemy has been represented by different “faces” but in most of the cases the fights have been 
brought on the cyber battlefield.  
More or less from the same period on the other side of the globe, countries like Russia and 
China started their campaign of “hacktivism” favoring fundamentally a more hard power strategy. 
These can be the cases of Estonia in 2007 or Georgia in 2008: in both cases “the Russian 
government seems to have abetted the hackers while maintaining “plausible deniability.” (Nye 
2010, 6). Also China has been accused many times to be the executor of cyberattacks against other 
countries and to protect the web intruders, but because of the shift of the conflicts in cyberspace, 
the material and touchable enemy has been abolished and for this reason it’s not always easy to 
find the culpable. According to Maria Bejarano:  
Soft power will succeed over hard power in cyberspace in the foreseeable future. 
Attraction and cooperation strategies will overcome those that apply force in order 
to control. This limits the role of military power in cyberspace while maintaining 
the need for adapted government policy and programs. Attempting to exert an 
excessive control may cause more harm than good. If soft power is applied […] 
expansionism and security will be reachable at the same time (Bejarano 2013, 6). 
 
The main takeaway from utilizing a soft power approach in explain the U.S. behavior is 
that they have sought to control cyberspace not through coercive or aggressive measures, but 
through soft power means of attraction and persuasion. Meanwhile Russia and its allies have been 
more direct in both their use of cyber weapons and their assertion in the need for direct control 
over cyberspace. 
 
                                                          
11 CACI International Inc., is a multinational company with the aim to provide technology information and IT 
assistance to different branches of the U.S. government. More information available at  
< http://www.caci.com/ > 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
At the onset of this project, a fairly distinct contradiction was presented: why are those 
states which seem most willing to use their cyber capabilities to achieve desired outcomes 
proposing an international treaty for cybersecurity, while the nation which is the target of the vast 
majority of those attacks is opposing that treaty? As it turns out, the answer to this question is 
neither simple nor discrete.  
In considering this predicament, it is necessary to go back to the foundations of the Internet 
and how the open and anonymous nature has created both problems and benefits for all parties 
involved. While the United States is able to use the open nature of the Internet to their advantage 
in economy and the spread of their ideals, they have also made themselves heavily reliant upon a 
system which they cannot control, even to protect themselves. Meanwhile Russia and its allies 
benefit from a domain in which the U.S. cannot unequivocally dominate, but whose free and open 
nature represents a fundamental risk to the stability of their regimes.  
This project sought an answer to this question by approaching it from three different 
theoretical perspectives: Offense-Defense, Soft-Balancing, and Soft Power Theories. The first 
explanation concludes that although the United States may indeed desire an international solution 
to the cybersecurity issue, they adhere to a policy which maintains that cybersecurity is unlikely 
to be achieved because the balance favors the offense, i.e. there is much more to be gained by 
using ones cyber capabilities than by focusing on defense. This is due to the inherent nature of 
cyber weapons, which only have to find one weakness in order to exploit an adversaries network, 
whereas cyber defense must predict a plethora of possible attacks. Furthermore, even if an 
agreement were to be reached, when one looks more closely at the proposed treaties thus far, they 
do not offer an impartial solution to both sides. It is unlikely that the U.S. would ever be willing 
to sacrifice the necessary ground in order to reach consensus, not only because it 
disproportionately benefits from the freedom of the net and its cyber espionage capabilities, but 
also because there is a tendency in the American political rhetoric, especially on the cybersecurity 
issue, to believe that whatever activities it engages in are righteous, while whatever activities 
others engage in are criminal. 
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The next analysis utilizes Soft-Balancing theory to explain how Russia and its allies have 
perhaps perceived both the U.S. control of the Internet, as well as their cyber capabilities such as 
the Stuxnet Virus, as examples of U.S. hegemonic aggression, and have joined with likeminded 
states such as China to constrain and balance against the U.S. From this perspective, the U.S. 
views the presentation by Russia of a multilateral cybersecurity treaty not as an olive branch meant 
to end a problem which is negatively affecting all industrialized nations, but as a direct threat to 
American hegemony. Several ways in which Russia, along with China and other allies have 
utilized soft-balancing techniques to oppose the U.S. are demonstrated.  
The final analysis employs Soft Power theory to demonstrate the different ways by which 
the U.S. and Russia/China have addressed the cybersecurity issue, with the U.S. preferring to use 
their vast wealth of soft power resources to influence the debate, and the opposing side asserting 
the need for more direct control and regulation. In this mode, U.S. adversaries may also seek to 
control the Internet through a cybersecurity treaty as a way of constraining and limiting American 
Soft Power resources.  
No single theory offers a definitive explanation to the question. Rather the answer most 
likely lies in the tentative nexus of the combined explanations offered within this work and the 
plethora of explanations which our analysis did not manage to address. Cybersecurity, like many 
other areas in the International Relations arena, is not black and white. It can reasonably be said 
that the United States has rejected Russian proposals because they doubt the Russian motivations 
and fear that their efforts are an attempt to balance against American hegemony and believe in a 
free and open Internet by which to spread American ideals and soft power and want to continue 
using those aspects of cyberwar and espionage which they can benefit, while somehow preventing 
everyone else from doing the same thing.  Likewise, it is likely that Russia may have proposed a 
treaty because they genuinely believe that norms and codes of conduct should be created and they 
want to balance against American aggression and they fear that an open Internet is dangerous to 
the stability of their regime.  
This project cannot definitively answer why the United States and Russia have behaved  
the way they have. Unless Washington and the Kremlin issue verifiable statements explaining 
their behavior, this may never be possible. Rather the contribution of this project is to offer a new 
framework by which to study the policy interactions of major players in the cybersecurity field, 
and offer a small amount of insight in this particular situation.  
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